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Contaminated Relationships in the Opioid Crisis 
ELISSA PHILIP GENTRY† & BENJAMIN J. MCMICHAEL† 
Unlike past public health crises, the opioid crisis arose from within the healthcare system itself. 
Entities within that system, particularly opioid manufacturers, may bear some liability in sparking 
and perpetuating the current crisis. Unsurprisingly, the allegations underlying the thousands of 
claims filed in connection with the opioid crisis differ substantially. However, almost all of those 
claims rely, to some degree, on the strength of the relationship between opioid manufacturers and 
the healthcare providers who prescribed their products. This Article argues that the underlying 
relationship is the heart of the crisis and that this problematic relationship is by no means a thing 
of the past. 
This Article provides critically important empirical evidence on the provider-manufacturer 
relationship. Analyzing a novel dataset constructed solely for this Article, the Article examines 
the role of payments from pharmaceutical companies to healthcare providers in inducing the 
latter to prescribe more opioids. This analysis reveals robust and consistent empirical evidence 
that pharmaceutical companies continue to pay healthcare providers, and providers receiving 
higher levels of payments prescribe more opioids. This analysis is limited to legal payments, so it 
cannot establish any basis of liability by itself. However, the relationships elucidated by this 
empirical evidence are the types that can facilitate the activities plaintiffs in the ongoing opioid 
litigation have alleged. Thus, the evidence developed and presented in this Article provides 
critically important insight into the role of manufacturers in the opioid crisis and into the litigation 
that crisis has generated. 
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 † Assistant Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. Alicia Gilbert provided outstanding 
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INTRODUCTION 
Are the forces fueling the opioid epidemic truly extinguished? To believe 
so is tremendously tempting: for the first time since the crisis’s beginning, 
opioid-related deaths declined in 2018.1 In the wake of the devastation wreaked 
by the epidemic, litigation accelerated, with victims and governments filing 
hundreds of claims. Though different theories underlie these claims, many share 
a common component—the relationship between the pharmaceutical companies 
that manufacture opioids and the healthcare providers who prescribe them. This 
Article argues that this relationship is at the heart of the opioid crisis and presents 
empirical evidence suggesting that, despite being past the peak of the crisis, the 
current relationship between payments from pharmaceutical companies and 
opioid prescriptions remains problematic.   
The opioid crisis represents the greatest threat to the public health of this 
generation.2 Near the peak of the crisis in 2017, an American died every eleven 
minutes from a drug overdose involving an opioid.3 Unlike public health crises 
of the past—such as the influenza pandemic of the late 1910s or the spread of 
the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) of the 1980s and 1990s—the opioid 
epidemic arose within the healthcare system itself. Indeed, a former Director of 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has explained that the opioid crisis 
“start[ed] in doctor’s offices and hospitals.”4  
The opioid crisis began in earnest around 2000,5 and over the next fifteen 
years, the number of opioid prescriptions quadrupled.6 This explosion in 
prescription opioid use has led to profound consequences. By 2015, over 63% 
of the 52,404 drug overdose deaths recorded by the Centers for Disease Control 
 
 1. Holly Hedegaard, Arialdi M. Miniño & Margaret Warner, Drug Overdose Deaths in the United States, 
1999–2018, 356 NCHS DATA BRIEF, Jan. 2020, at 1, 1.   
 2. See RICHARD J. BONNIE, MORGAN A. FORD & JONATHAN K. PHILLIPS, PAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE 
OPIOID EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION OPIOID USE 
187 (2017) (“Not since the HIV/AIDS epidemic has the United States faced as devastating and lethal a health 
problem as the current crisis of opioid misuse and overdose and opioid use disorder (OUD).”). 
 3. The Evolution of the Opioid Crisis: 2000–2017, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. (Aug. 2019), 
https://www.nihcm.org/categories/the-evolution-of-the-opioid-crisis-2000-2017; The Evolution of the Opioid 
Crisis: 2000–2018, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. (May 2020), https://nihcm.org/publications/the-
evolution-of-the-opioid-crisis-2000-2018. 
 4. WHITE HOUSE COMM’N ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION & THE OPIOID CRISIS, DRAFT INTERIM 
REPORT 1 (July 31, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/ondcp/commission-interim-
report.pdf. 
 5. See Richard C. Dart, Hilary L. Surratt, Theodore J. Cicero, Mark W. Parrino, S. Geoff Severtson, Becki 
Bucher-Bartelson & Jody L. Green, Trends in Opioid Analgesic Abuse and Mortality in the United States, 372 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 241, 242 (2015); Marcia K. Merboth & Susan Barnason, Managing Pain: The Fifth Vital 
Sign, 35 NURSING CLINICS N. AM. 375, 377 (2000); Rose A. Rudd, Noah Aleshire, Jon E. Zibbell & R. Matthew 
Gladden, Increases in Drug and Opioid Overdose Deaths—United States, 2000–2014, 64 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1378, 1378–82 (2016); D. Andrew Tompkins, J. Greg Hobelmann & Peggy Compton, 
Providing Chronic Pain Management in the “Fifth Vital Sign” Era: Historical and Treatment Perspectives on 
a Modern-Day Medical Dilemma, 173 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE S11, S12–18 (2017); Michael R. Von 
Korff & Gary Franklin, Responding to America’s Iatrogenic Epidemic of Prescription Opioid Addiction and 
Overdose, 54 MED. CARE 426, 428 (2016). 
 6. Rudd et al., supra note 5, at 1378–82.   
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and Prevention (CDC) involved an opioid.7 The opioid crisis’s collateral 
damage, however, has not been limited to deaths. Increased opioid use has fueled 
growth in opioid addiction rates,8 opioid-related traffic accidents,9 admissions 
to facilities for substance abuse,10 opioid-related emergency room visits,11 
opioid-related hospital admissions,12 and the occurrence of neonatal abstinence 
syndrome (infants born addicted to opioids).13 Experts have estimated the costs 
of the opioid epidemic to hospitals alone at roughly $11 billion annually,14 and 
the societal costs at over $95 billion.15 Once the value of lost human life is 
included, the costs surge to over $500 billion.16   
This overwhelming impact begs for a tractable policy solution; however, 
the disjointed evolution of the opioid crisis—and the role that illegal opioids 
have played—have complicated efforts to address the crisis. The CDC has 
classified the opioid crisis into three separate waves based on the type of opioids 
responsible for increases in opioid-related deaths.17 A surge in the use of 
prescription opioids, including those legally prescribed by healthcare providers, 
ignited the first wave of the crisis around 2000.18 During the second wave in 
2011, heroin—illicitly manufactured and distributed outside the healthcare 
 
 7. Rose A. Rudd, Puja Seth, Felicita David & Lawrence Scholl, Increases in Drug and Opioid-Involved 
Overdose Deaths—United States, 2010–2015, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1145, 1145 (2016).  
 8. Andrew Kolodny, David T. Courtwright, Catherine S. Hwang, Peter Kreiner, John L. Eadie, Thomas 
W. Clark & G. Caleb Alexander, The Prescription Opioid and Heroin Crisis: A Public Health Approach to an 
Epidemic of Addiction, 36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 559, 559 (2015). 
 9. Guohua Li & Stanford Chihuri, Prescription Opioids, Alcohol and Fatal Motor Vehicle Crashes: A 
Population-Based Case-Control Study, 6 INJ. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1, 1–3 (2019). 
 10. Andrew S. Huhn, Eric C. Strain, D. Andrew Tompkins & Kelly E. Dunn, A Hidden Aspect of the U.S. 
Opioid Crisis: Rise in First-Time Treatment Admissions for Older Adults with Opioid Use Disorder, 193 DRUG 
& ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 142, 142 (2018). 
 11. Christopher M. Jones & Jana K. McAninch, Emergency Department Visits and Overdose Deaths from 
Combined Use of Opioids and Benzodiazepines, 49 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 493, 497–500 (2015). 
 12. Hilary Mosher, Yunshou Zhou, Andrew L. Thurman, Mary Vaughan Sarrazin & Michael E. Ohl, 
Trends in Hospitalization for Opioid Overdose Among Rural Compared to Urban Residents of the United States, 
2007–2014, 12 J. HOSP. MED. 925, 925 (2017); Jennifer P. Stevens, Michael J. Wall, Lena Novack, John 
Marshall, Douglas J. Hsu & Michael D. Howell, The Critical Care Crisis of Opioid Overdoses in the United 
States, 14 ANNALS AM. THORACIC SOC’Y 1803, 1808 (2017).  
 13. Neonatal abstinence syndrome occurs when an infant born to an opioid-addicted mother experiences 
symptoms of opioid withdrawal. Stephen W. Patrick, Robert E. Schumacher, Brian D. Benneyworth, Elizabeth 
E. Krans, Jennifer M. McAllister & Matthew M. Davis, Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome and Associated Health 
Care Expenditures: United States, 2000–2009, 307 JAMA 1934, 1934–37 (2012). 
 14. Press Release, Premier, Opioid Overdoses Costing U.S. Hospitals an Estimated $11 Billion Annually 
(Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.premierinc.com/newsroom/press-releases/opioid-overdoses-costing-u-s-hospitals-
an-estimated-11-billion-annually. 
 15. See CORWIN N. RHYAN, THE POTENTIAL SOCIETAL BENEFIT OF ELIMINATING OPIOID OVERDOSES, 
DEATHS, AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS EXCEEDS $95 BILLION PER YEAR 1 (2017), https://altarum.org/sites/ 
default/files/uploaded-publication-files/Research-Brief_Opioid-Epidemic-Economic-Burden.pdf.  
 16. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE UNDERESTIMATED COST OF THE OPIOID CRISIS 1 (2017),  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/The%20Underestimated%20Cost%20of%20th
e%20Opioid%20Crisis.pdf. 
 17. Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).  
 18. The Evolution of the Opioid Crisis: 2000–2017, supra note 3. 
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system—became a salient part of the crisis.19 A third wave emerged in 2013, 
characterized by synthetic opioids—substances that mimic naturally occurring 
opioids such as codeine and morphine and tend to be highly potent.20 These 
synthetic opioids, which may be produced and distributed through legal or illegal 
channels, contributed to many accidental overdoses, particularly when synthetic 
opioids were mistaken for, or mixed with, traditional opioids.21  
The growth in deaths attributable to illicit opioids has caused some 
confusion about the responsibility of the healthcare system for the opioid crisis. 
Illegal drug usage is neither new nor unique to the opioid crisis. Illegal opioid 
use, however, differs from other illegal drug use in the closeness of its 
connection with the modern healthcare system. Prescription opioid use is often 
the catalyst for subsequent abuse of illegal opioids, as “the majority of users start 
taking opioids that are prescribed by their physicians, even if they later progress 
to illicit or illegal opioid use.”22 Scott Gottlieb, the former Commissioner of the 
FDA, explained that “[m]ost people who become addicted to opioids become 
medically addicted. Their first exposure is going to be a clinical prescription that 
they receive in a clinical setting, and then they’ll go on to develop an 
addiction.”23  
Accordingly, despite the uptick in deaths attributable to illegal opioids, the 
heart of the opioid crisis remains within the healthcare system. Indeed, the use 
of illegal substances does not necessarily limit the responsibility of the 
healthcare system in the opioid crisis, as recently recognized by West Virginia—
one of the states hardest hit by the opioid crisis.24 In Tug Valley Pharmacy v. All 
Plaintiffs, the West Virginia Supreme Court refused to hold that the illegal 
consumption of opioids bars the imposition of liability on healthcare providers 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Synthetic Opioid Overdose Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/fentanyl.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2021); Opioid Data Analysis and 
Resources, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/analysis.html 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2021). Examples include tramadol and fentanyl, which may be produced and distributed 
through legal or illegal channels. See Opioid Data Analysis and Resources, supra; Synthetic Opioid Overuse 
Data, supra.  
 21. See Synthetic Opioid Overdose Data, supra note 20.  
 22. Janet Currie, Jonas Y. Jin & Molly Schnell, U.S. Employment and Opioids: Is There a Connection? 2 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24440, 2018), https://www.nber.org/system/files/ 
working_papers/w24440/w24440.pdf (“The epidemic is particularly shocking since the majority of users start 
taking opioids that are prescribed by their physicians, even if they later progress to illicit or illegal opioid use.”); 
Jennifer L. Doleac & Anita Mukherjee, The Moral Hazard of Lifesaving Innovations: Naloxone Access, Opioid 
Abuse, and Crime 6 (IZA Inst. of Lab. Econ., Discussion Paper No. 11489, 2018), http://ftp.iza.org/dp11489.pdf 
(“Individuals are prescribed these drugs to treat pain, but many patients develop addictions that lead them to 
illegal use of prescription opioids and cheaper substitutes such as heroin.”).  
 23. FDA’s Scott Gottlieb: Opioid Addiction Is FDA’s Biggest Crisis Now, CNBC (July 21, 2017, 8:24 
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2017/07/21/fdas-scott-gottlieb-opioid-addiction-is-fdas-biggest-crisis-
now.html. 
 24. See Tug Valley Pharmacy, LLC v. All Plaintiffs Below in Mingo Cty., 773 S.E.2d 627, 628 (W. Va. 
2015). 
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for their role in allowing patients to become addicted to opioids.25 Importantly, 
the court held that the criminal consumption of illicit opioids by the patients does 
not extinguish the liability of the providers who originally prescribed legal 
opioids.26 This decision provides an appropriate lens for the opioid crisis. While 
illegal opioids may have risen in importance based on the number of deaths 
caused, the path to those deaths often begins with legal prescription opioids.27   
Given the importance of initial prescriptions of opioids and the follow-on 
effects of opioid over-prescription, this Article focuses on the relationship that 
arguably ignited the crisis: the relationship between pharmaceutical companies 
and the physicians who prescribe opioids. Part I examines the importance of the 
relationship between pharmaceutical companies and providers in initiating and 
perpetuating the opioid crisis. It details why, despite the multiplicity of claims 
made in the current litigation, the prescriber-pharmaceutical company 
relationship underlies almost all claims filed in connection with the opioid crisis. 
Given the importance of this relationship, Part II describes a theoretical model 
that differentiates between pharmaceutical companies playing a purely unbiased 
educational role and inappropriately persuading healthcare providers to 
prescribe more opioids. Part II also relies on this model to develop testable 
hypotheses about the nature of the relationship between pharmaceutical 
companies and prescribers.  
Part III uses empirical analysis to test the hypotheses developed in Part II. 
Using statistical matching techniques to match multiple data sources, Part III 
provides novel evidence on the relationship between pharmaceutical payments 
and physician prescriptions. In general, the evidence suggests that payments 
from pharmaceutical companies are associated with increases in opioid 
prescriptions. Further, by exploiting the passage of state laws meant to educate 
providers on the prevalence of opioid prescriptions, Part III shows that this 
positive correlation is more consistent with pharmaceutical companies 
persuading healthcare providers to prescribe more opioids than with a legitimate 
educational function. Part IV examines the implications of these results, 
concluding that the continued importance of pharmaceutical payments in 
prescription decisions is problematic. It argues that this continued importance 
may support claims within the current opioid litigation. Part IV also explores the 






 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 636. 
 27. See WHITE HOUSE COMM’N ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION & THE OPIOID CRISIS, supra note 4, at 
1.  
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I.  ORIGINS OF THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC AND THE PRESCRIBER-
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY RELATIONSHIP 
The existence of the opioid crisis is as apparent as its origins are murky. As 
noted above, several factors have contributed to the opioid crisis. For example, 
underlying issues of mental health and socioeconomic instability may drive the 
demand for illegal opioids.28 Relatedly, economic challenges for middle-aged 
whites without a college degree stemming from deindustrialization and cuts to 
social safety nets have been blamed for the rise of “diseases of despair”—drug 
overdose, alcohol-related disease, and suicide—which are often tightly 
connected with the opioid crisis.29 These factors are perceived to have increased 
the long-term demand for opioids, particularly illegal opioids.30 However, the 
focus here is the role of the relationship between providers and pharmaceutical 
companies in creating the initial demand for opioids and in supplying much of 
the prescription drugs that began the crisis two decades ago.  
This Part examines the origins of the opioid epidemic and argues that it 
evolved from a mixture of well-meaning policies aimed at addressing 
undertreated pain and misleading scientific information from pharmaceutical 
companies. In July 2017, the White House Commission on Combating Drug 
Addiction and the Opioid Crisis explained that the opioid crisis “start[s] in 
doctor’s offices and hospitals.”31 In offering this explanation, the Commission 
did not blame physicians, and this Article similarly does not seek to offer blanket 
accusations against those on the front lines of healthcare. However, 
understanding the opioid crisis necessarily requires understanding changes in 
physicians’ approaches to pain management and opioid prescribing. This Part 
begins by exploring changes in these approaches that led to an increase in opioid 
prescriptions. In turn, the excess supply of opioids generated by such over-
prescription fueled the crisis in at least three ways: (1) patients who are legally 
prescribed opioids for an extended period of time are more likely to become 
addicted, (2) the excess supply is diverted from legal uses and used by those 
without a prescription, or (3) the excess supply is sold on the black market.  
Well-meaning prescribers were not alone in causing the opioid crisis, 
however. Pharmaceutical manufacturers took several courses of action which 
may have contributed to the current epidemic. Although some scholars maintain 
that the increase in supply was an unfortunate consequence of a genuine desire 
to cater to an undertreated population, a more cynical explanation—and one 
which is gaining popular and legal traction—views the development of the 
opioid crisis as a foreseeable consequence of interference by pharmaceutical 
 
 28. See Nabarun Dasgupta, Leo Beletsky & Daniel Ciccarone, Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and 
Economic Determinants, 108 AJPH PERSPS. 182, 183 (2018). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.  
 31. WHITE HOUSE COMM’N ON COMBATING DRUG ADDICTION & THE OPIOID CRISIS, supra note 4, at 1. 
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companies.32 This interference took various forms, including the use of false and 
misleading advertising.33 Understanding the strategies these companies used to 
become involved in providers’ prescribing decisions gives important context for 
the empirical analysis presented below.  
A. THE UNDERTREATMENT OF PAIN 
The initial change in prescribing patterns that precipitated the opioid crisis 
was spurred by the noblest of factors: (1) the recognition that pain has 
traditionally been undertreated, and (2) new evidence supporting the safety of 
opioids. Studies in the 1990s highlighted the systematic under-treatment of both 
cancer and non-cancer pain.34 Related research suggested that inadequate 
treatment of pain disproportionately affected racial minorities and the elderly, 
noting the “significant disparities between those who received analgesic 
treatment for pain, particularly among racial and ethnic minorities as well as for 
differences in age.”35  
In response to such studies, two significant policy changes ensured that 
physicians would pay more attention to patient pain. First, the Joint 
Commission, an organization that monitors hospitals and medical centers and 
promulgates standards for accreditation, revised its standards for treating pain.36 
The new standards “emphasized the need to perform systematic assessments of 
patients’ pain levels regularly and frequently while hospitalized.”37 Because 
Joint Commission accreditation of hospitals and medical centers is often relied 
upon by state governments in quality oversight,38 these elevated standards 
encouraged providers to treat pain more aggressively.  
Second, and working in conjunction with the Joint Commissions’ new 
standards, the government changed the way it incorporated patient satisfaction 
as a measure of hospital quality. In response to an Institute of Medicine report 
criticizing the quality of health care in the United States, Congress required the 
 
 32. See Scott G. Weiner, Sayeed K. Malek & Christin N. Price, The Opioid Crisis and Its Consequences, 
101 TRANSPLANTATION 678, 679 (2017). 
 33. See infra Part I.B. 
 34. See Weiner et al., supra note 32, at 679; Teresa A. Rummans, M. Caroline Burton & Nancy L. Dawson, 
How Good Intentions Contributed to Bad Outcomes: The Opioid Crisis, 93 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 344, 346 (2018). 
 35. Weiner et al., supra note 32, at 679 (citing Salimah H. Meghani, Eeeseung Byun & Rollin M. 
Gallagher, Time to Take Stock: A Meta-Analysis and Systematic Review of Analgesic Treatment Disparities for 
Pain in the United States, 13 PAIN MED. 150, 151 (2012); Karen O. Anderson, Carmen R. Green & Richard 
Payne, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Pain: Causes and Consequences of Unequal Care, 10 J. PAIN 1187, 
1187–89 (2009); Alexie Cintron & R. Sean Morrison, Pain and Ethnicity in the United States: A Systematic 
Review, 9 J. PALLIAT. MED. 1454, 1454–56 (2006); and Ula Hwang, Laura K. Belland, Daniel A. Handel, Kabir 
Yadav, Kennon Heard, Laura Rivera-Reyes, Amanda Eisenberg, Matthew J. Noble, Sudha Mekala, Morgan 
Valley, Gary Winkel, Knox H. Todd & Sean R. Morrison, Is All Pain Is Treated Equally? A Multicenter 
Evaluation of Acute Pain Care by Age, 155 PAIN 2568, 2568–72 (2014)). 
 36. Rummans et al., supra note 34, at 346. 
 37. Id. 
 38. State Recognition, JOINT COMM’N, https://www.jointcommission.org/en/accreditation-and-
certification/state-recognition/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
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Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to promulgate the Hospital 
Consumer of Healthcare Providers and Systems Survey to measure quality.39 To 
address the concern about patient experience, three out of the twenty-five 
questions in this survey inquired about how well hospital providers managed 
patients’ pain.40 Because this measure affected providers’ reimbursement from 
Medicare, they began concentrating on delivering more intensive pain 
management treatments.41 Thus, a well-intentioned effort to increase the quality 
of medical services resulted in an overemphasis on the provision of pain 
medication.  
Compounding these various institutional factors pushing physicians to treat 
pain more intensively was the recognition of “a moral imperative for physicians 
to treat pain and relieve suffering.”42 The moral obligation is documented in the 
Declaration of Montreal, which recognized the “fundamental human right” of 
pain management.43 That document acknowledges “[t]he right of all people to 
have access to pain management without discrimination,” and emphasizes the 
“inadequate access to treatment for acute pain” and the “severe restrictions on 
the availability of opioids and other essential medications, [which are] critical to 
the management of pain.”44 Similarly, scholarly work began to emphasize the 
importance of pain as a “fifth vital sign,” encouraging physicians to treat it more 
aggressively.45 In 1996, the American Academy of Pain Medicine and the 
American Pain Society issued a statement arguing that opioids should be used 
even in chronic noncancer pain.46 
In response to this increase in opioid use, most states passed intractable 
pain statutes.47 These states provided safe harbors for physicians prescribing 
long-term opioid therapy.48 Further insulated from board discipline, spurred by 
a sense of professional duty, and incentivized by institutional evaluations that 
affected payment, physicians unsurprisingly increased opioid prescription 
rates.49 Importantly, however, these factors alone were not enough to spark the 
 
 39. Rummans et al., supra note 34, at 346–347. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 346. 
 42. Weiner et al., supra note 32, at 679.   
 43. Id.  
 44. Declaration of Montréal, INT’L ASS’N FOR THE STUDY OF PAIN, https://www.iasp-pain.org/Declaration 
ofMontreal?navItemNumber=582 (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).  
 45. Merboth & Barnason, supra note 5, at 377; Tompkins et al., supra note 5, at S11–S21; Richard A. 
Mularski, Foy White-Chu, Devorah Overbay, Lois Miller, Steven M. Asch & Linda Ganzini, Measuring Pain 
as the 5th Vital Sign Does Not Improve Quality of Pain Management, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 607, 607 
(2006). 
 46. Rummans et al., supra note 34, at 345.  
 47. See FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., PAIN MANAGEMENT POLICIES, https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/ 
advocacy/key-issues/pain-management-by-state.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (listing statutes by state). 
 48. Id. at 345–46. The level of protection provided by each statute varies, but physicians were somewhat 
protected from discipline for long-term opioid prescription. Id.  
 49. Id. at 345–48. 
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opioid crisis. As the following Subpart details, pharmaceutical companies 
played a vital role as well.  
B. NEW INFORMATION ON OPIOIDS FROM PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES  
As providers and regulators increasingly acknowledged and even touted 
the benefits of pain management with opioids, emerging research began to 
suggest that the risk of harm associated with these medications—including 
addiction—was lower than previously believed.50 Plaintiffs in the current 
litigation assert, however, that much of this research was paid for by the 
pharmaceutical industry and did not offer valid scientific conclusions.51 Indeed, 
several particularly relevant announcements, which fell far below the standard 
of rigorous research, garnered disproportionate attention and credibility.52  
These focal announcements spurred the push for more opioids.53 For example, a 
one-paragraph letter in the New England Journal of Medicine reported the 
results of a retrospective review of pain patients, finding that only 4 of the 11,882 
patients became addicted.54 This letter was cited over 600 times as support for 
providers seeking to expand the use of prescription opioids.55 Similarly, in 1998, 
Purdue Pharma (“Purdue”)—an opioid manufacturer at the center of many 
current lawsuits—circulated a video entitled “I Got My Life Back,” which 
documented six patients whose chronic, non-cancer pain was treated by 
opioids.56 Following this promotional message, prescriptions for OxyContin 
increased from 670,000 in 1997 to 6.2 million in 2002, and the total number of 
opioid prescriptions increased by 45 million.57  
In addition to media attention, research on “pseudoaddiction” encouraged 
physicians to continue prescribing opioids to patients who appeared to suffer 
similar symptoms as addicts. Researchers David Weissman and J. David 
Haddox first outlined pseudoaddiction in 1989.58 David Haddox later became a 
Senior Medical Director for Purdue.59 Designated an “iatrogenic” syndrome, a 
syndrome induced by a healthcare provider as opposed to arising from natural 
causes,60 pseudoaddiction ostensibly affects patients receiving inadequate pain 
 
 50. See Rummans et al., supra note 34, at 345.  
 51. See infra Part I.C. 
 52. See Rummans et al., supra note 34, at 345. 
 53. See id.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 346. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Marion S. Greene & R. Andrew Chambers, Pseudoaddiction: Fact or Fiction? An Investigation of the 
Medical Literature, 2 CURRENT ADDICTION REPS. 310, 311 (2015). 
 59. Complaint at 55, Bradford Cnty. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 19-00702 (M.D. Fla. June 11, 2019). 
 60. Iatrogenic is defined as a condition “induced inadvertently by a physician or surgeon or by medical 
treatment or diagnostic procedures.” Iatrogenic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/iatrogenic?src=search-dict-box (last visited Feb. 25, 2021). Greene and Chambers note that in 
describing pseudoaddiction as an iatrogenic disease, Weissman and Haddox flipped the definition on its head 
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management.61 Patients suffering from pseudoaddiction supposedly progress 
through three separate phases. First, a patient experiencing pain receives 
inadequate pain management and requests additional medication.62 Second, the 
patient learns that in order to receive more medication, he or she must convince 
his or her physician of the need for such medication.63 Third, the patient engages 
in drug-seeking behavior, creating mistrust in the physician-patient 
relationship.64 The described symptoms of pseudoaddiction, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, are almost indistinguishable from true addiction.65 Unlike the 
treatment for true addiction, however, research on pseudoaddiction 
recommended that physicians prescribe more, and not fewer, opioids.66 A later 
study analyzing the medical literature regarding the validity of pseudoaddiction 
concluded that empirical evidence does not support its existence.67 
In addition to the literature on pseudoaddiction, a few key opinion 
leaders—later alleged to have been paid by pharmaceutical companies68—
became prolific sources of research, concluding that opioids are safe. A notable 
example is Dr. Russell Portenoy. Portenoy—hired as a consultant by several 
pharmaceutical companies—advocated for the increased use of opioids, 
particularly in the treatment of non-cancer pain.69 Dubbed the “King of Pain,”70 
he published an article based on a study of thirty-eight cases, concluding that 
opioid treatment can be a safe option for patients with intractable non-malignant 
pain and no history of drug abuse.71 He also allegedly served as a member of the 
American Pain Society and American Academy of Pain Medicine Guidelines 
Committee, organizations which “endorsed [the use of] opioids to treat chronic 
[non-cancer] pain.”72 Later, in exchange for legal immunity, Portenoy admitted 
that pharmaceutical companies “‘overstated the benefits of chronic-opioid 
therapy’ and ‘understated the risks of opioids, particularly the risk of abuse, 
addiction and overdose.’”73  
 
since pseudoaddiction is theoretically caused by the withholding of treatment, not the provision of treatment. 
Greene & Chambers, supra note 58, at 311. 
 61. Greene & Chambers, supra note 58, at 311. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 314.  
 68. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 59, at 103–06.  
 69. Complaint at 19, City of Fargo v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 19-00139 (D. N.D. July 9, 2019); Jef Feeley, 
Opioid Evangelist Switches Sides in Case Alleging Pharma Abuse, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 8, 2019, 8:56 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-08/opioid-evangelist-switches-sides-in-case-alleging-
pharma-abuse. 
 70. Arthur H. Gale, Drug Company Compensated Physicians Role in Causing America’s Deadly Opioid 
Epidemic: When Will We Learn?, 113 MO. MED. 244, 244 (2016). 
 71. Russell K. Portenoy & Kathleen M. Foley, Chronic Use of Opioid Analgesics in Non-Malignant Pain: 
Report of 38 Cases, 25 PAIN 171, 171–86 (1986). 
 72. Complaint, supra note 59, at 90. 
 73. Feeley, supra note 69. 
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Exposed to this new information on the safety of opioids even for 
noncancer pain, in conjunction with the new policy emphasis on relieving pain, 
providers understandably responded by prescribing more opioids.74 While there 
are legitimate reasons to be sensitive to populations with truly undertreated 
pain,75 the misinformation about the risks associated with opioids propagated by 
pharmaceutical companies helped ignite the current crisis. This misinformation 
would later become the basis for many of the lawsuits connected with that crisis, 
which is reviewed in the next Subpart.    
C. CURRENT LITIGATION REFLECTS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRESCRIBER-
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY RELATIONSHIP  
As the full burden of the opioid crisis became clear, litigation over the 
harms associated with increased opioid use exploded. The first wave of that 
litigation has culminated in the multidistrict litigation under Judge Polster76 and 
the first verdict against Johnson & Johnson in Oklahoma.77 This Subpart engages 
with the theories underlying the current litigation and detail why, regardless of 
the specific claim, the dynamic between pharmaceutical companies and 
prescribers constitutes the heart of current litigation.78 
At first glance, the most natural target of lawsuits filed by patients who 
become addicted to opioids would appear to be the healthcare providers who 
prescribed them. Providers have faced several lawsuits in connection with the 
opioid crisis. For example, the West Virginia Supreme Court recently addressed 
whether wrongful conduct of opioid addicts served as a complete bar to recovery 
against physicians for negligent over-prescription.79 It held that patients could 
hold prescribers liable for their addiction even if those patients engaged in illegal 
activity—such as consuming heroin or other illicit opioids—in addition to the 
prescription opioids furnished by the providers.80 Similarly, major drugstore 
chains have sued unnamed physicians, claiming that prescribers should pay 
some of the potential penalty levied against drugstores based on their over-
prescription.81 While it would come as no surprise to see more claims filed 
against providers in the future, the bulk of the opioid litigation has focused on 
 
 74. Rummans et al., supra note 34, at 347–48. 
 75. We do not mean to suggest that opioids should never be prescribed or that the unavailability of opioids 
negatively impacts some patients. We only mean to suggest that, consistent with existing research, opioids have 
been overprescribed in the aggregate.  
 76. In re Nat’l Prescription Opioid Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2017). 
 77. Jan Hoffman, Johnson & Johnson Ordered to Pay $572 Million in Landmark Opioid Trial, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/health/oklahoma-opioids-johnson-and-johnson.html. 
 78. Of course, current litigation also involves distributors and pharmacies accused of similar conduct, but 
we focus on pharmaceutical manufacturers.  
 79. Tug Valley Pharmacy, LLC v. All Plaintiffs Below in Mingo Cnty., 773 S.E.2d 627, 630 (W.Va. 2015). 
 80. Id. at 635–36. 
 81. Lenny Bernstein, Major Drugstore Chains Sue Doctors in Sprawling Federal Opioid Case, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 8, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/major-drugstore-chains-sue-doctors-in-
sprawling-federal-opioid-case/2020/01/07/3ac9cd70-317d-11ea-9313-6cba89b1b9fb_story.html.  
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pharmaceutical companies.82 Accordingly, this Subpart focuses on claims filed 
against these defendants. 
Litigation in connection with the opioid crisis has been ongoing since the 
early 2000s,83 but this litigation has accelerated in the past few years. This 
Subpart concentrates on the most prominent current litigation—the multidistrict 
litigation (MDL) focused on holding pharmaceutical companies accountable for 
all the harms precipitated by the crisis. In general, these complaints assert 
numerous claims that pharmaceutical companies are responsible for the opioid 
crisis.84 The heart of the complaints center on two general patterns of behavior. 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors either (1) engaged in misleading 
or fraudulent advertising or (2) failed to monitor supply chains of controlled 
substances.85 This Subpart explains why both patterns inherently implicate the 
prescriber-pharmaceutical relationship.  
1. False and Misleading Advertising 
Many of the MDL complaints allege that pharmaceutical companies 
engaged in false and misleading advertisement, which led to physicians 
overprescribing opioids. This situation usually occurs in at least two ways. First, 
plaintiffs have alleged that pharmaceutical companies relayed false information 
to physicians.86 Second, and more nefariously, plaintiffs allege that 
pharmaceutical companies have used physicians to create new, misleading 
scientific information about the appropriateness of opioid use.87 
Concerning the relaying of existing false information, plaintiffs have 
accused pharmaceutical companies of offering information to physicians that 
systematically overvalues the benefits and undervalues the risks associated with 
opioids. Plaintiffs specifically accuse pharmaceutical companies of 
 
 82. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-MD-2804, 2019 WL 3917575, at *11–15 
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 19, 2019).  
 83. Rebecca Haffajee and Michelle Mello summarize the high-profile government and class action 
settlements from 2004 to 2017. Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Drug Companies’ Liability for the 
Opioid Epidemic, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2301, 2301–02 (2017).  
 84. Frequently brought claims include: (1) public nuisance—see, for example, Complaint, supra note 59, 
at 270; Complaint at 1, 4, Wayne Cnty. Comm’n v. Rite Aid of Maryland, Inc., No. 17-01962 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 
21, 2017) [hereinafter, Complaint, Wayne Cnty. Comm’n]; (2) Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (“RICO”) violations—see, for example, Complaint, supra note 59, at 234; (3) state consumer protections 
acts claims—see, for example, id. at 268; (4) negligence claims—see, for example, id. at 272–77; (5) fraud 
claims—see, for example, Complaint at 96, 115, 119, City of Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 14-04361 
(Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. June 2, 2014) [hereinafter Complaint, City of Chicago]; and (6) unjust enrichment claims—
see, for example, id. at 120; Complaint, supra note 59, at 277. While the City of Chicago is no longer part of the 
MDL, City of Chicago v. Purdue Pharma L.P. is informative of the relevant allegations.  
 85. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 59, at 39, 134; Complaint, City of Chicago, supra note 84, at 15; 
Complaint at 38, 132, City of Daytona Beach v. Purdue, No. 19-01103 (M.D. Fla. June 13, 2019). 
 86. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 59, at 39; Complaint, City of Chicago, supra note 84, at 15; Complaint, 
supra note 85, at 38. 
 87. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 69, at 9–10.  
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misrepresenting (1) the low addiction risk associated with chronic opioid use,88 
(2) the ease with which addiction can be detected and addressed,89 (3) the risks 
associated with alternative forms of pain relief,90 (4) the specific efficacy of 
particular opioids,91 and (5) the risks associated with increasing opioid doses.92 
These misrepresentations were intended to “create a series of misperceptions in 
the medical community.”93 
Concerning the creation of new misleading information, plaintiffs have 
alleged that pharmaceutical companies perpetuated misleading information by 
using physicians to create novel, but inaccurate, material about the 
appropriateness of opioid use, effectively contaminating the existing body of 
scientific evidence.94 Pharmaceutical companies are accused of paying 
physicians that they considered to be “key opinion leaders” to not only present 
lectures at continuing medical education (CME) events but to develop treatment 
guidelines that recommend the increased use of opioids.95 While Russell 
Portenoy is one of the best known “leaders” recruited by pharmaceutical 
companies, many other physicians engaged in similar behavior according to 
plaintiffs.96  
The provision of existing misleading information and the creation of new 
misinformation certainly implicates the relationship between pharmaceutical 
companies and physicians. While this relationship need not always involve the 
exchange of misleading information, a stronger bond between pharmaceutical 
companies and prescribers may facilitate the exchange of damaging information 
or strengthen the effect of this information on prescribers. Accordingly, 
understanding the nature and extent of this relationship is paramount in the 
ongoing litigation.   
2. Failure to Monitor Supply Chains 
The second pattern of behavior alleged by plaintiffs involves the failure of 
manufacturers and distributors to monitor opioid supply chains.97 Under the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), manufacturers and distributors have a 
statutory duty to design and operate a system to identify suspicious orders of 
controlled substances and notify the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
 
 88. Complaint, supra note 59, at 39; Complaint, supra note 69, at 9–10; Complaint, City of Chicago, supra 
note 84, at 23–27.  
 89. Complaint, supra note 59, at 53.  
 90. Id. at 67; Complaint, City of Chicago, supra note 84, at 42.  
 91. Complaint, supra note 59, at 70.  
 92. Id. at 59.  
 93. Id. at 38. 
 94. Complaint, supra note 69, at 10.  
 95. Complaint, supra note 59, at 85; Complaint, City of Chicago, supra note 84, at 53–59.  
 96. Complaint, supra note 59, at 106–12 (listing other key opinion leaders). 
 97. Complaint at 21, Logan Cnty. Comm’n v. Cardinal Health, No. 17-02296 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 11, 2017); 
Complaint, supra note 59, at 134; Complaint, Wayne Cnty. Comm’n, supra note 84, at 4. 
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upon the discovery of such an order.98 The accompanying regulations define as 
“suspicious” orders of “unusual size, orders deviating substantially from a 
normal pattern, and orders of unusual frequency.”99 Prior to the current 
litigation, the extent of this duty to monitor the supply chains remained an open 
question. Recently, however, the district court handling the MDL determined 
that the law imposes a duty both to identify and report suspicious orders and not 
to ship such orders.100 
In particular, the complaints allege that manufacturers and distributors had 
a duty, in connection with their general duty to monitor, to notice when 
physicians excessively prescribed opioids.101 Indeed, in In re National 
Prescription Opiate Litigation, the court noted that the DEA explicitly stated 
that “a distributor may not simply rely on the fact that the person placing the 
suspicious order is a DEA registrant and turn a blind eye to the suspicious 
circumstances.”102 Accordingly, while physicians retain professional judgment 
in how they prescribe, manufacturers and distributors have an independent duty 
to report suspicious orders. Moreover, the plaintiffs have argued that not only 
did manufacturers fail to recognize these suspicious orders—a form of 
diversion,103 according to complaints—manufacturers used their knowledge of 
which physicians were prescribing unusually large quantities of opioids to target 
these physicians for even more advertisements.104   
Overall, even the allegations concerning pharmaceutical companies’ 
failure to monitor supply chains rest (at least in some cases) on the relationships 
between these companies and the prescribers of their products. In light of the 
importance of the prescriber-pharmaceutical company relationship to the current 





 98. In particular, a registered entity has a duty to (1) “design and operate a system to identify suspicious 
orders” for itself, (2) “ensure that the system designed and operated . . . complies with applicable Federal and 
State privacy laws,” and (3) notify the DEA upon discovery of a suspicious order. 21 U.S.C. § 832(a) (2018). 
 99. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.74(b) (2020). 
 100. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-MD-2804, 2019 WL 3917575, at *7–9 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 
19, 2019). This independent legal duty seems to provide the basis for public nuisance and RICO claims. See 
Complaint, supra note 69, at 143. Of course, this does not mean that other district courts will agree. 
 101. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 59, at 134; Complaint, supra note 85, at 132.  
 102. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 2019 WL 3917575, at *5. 
 103. The DEA describes “diversion” as “the redirection of controlled substances which may have lawful 
uses into illicit channels,” Controlled Substances Quotas, 83 Fed. Reg. 32784, 32784 (July 16, 2018) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1303), and this term encompasses a wide variety of actions. Some complaints have 
alleged diversion as the actual theft from pharmacies or legitimate patients or the unauthorized use of a legitimate 
prescription by family members, see Complaint, supra note 85, at 154.  
 104. Complaint, supra note 85, at 156 (alleging that the “manufacturers were keenly aware of the doctors 
who were writing large quantities of opioids. But instead of investigating or reporting those doctors, Defendants 
were singularly focused on maintaining, capturing, or increasing their sales”). 
842 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:827 
II.  THE CONTINUING CONNECTION BETWEEN PHARMACEUTICAL 
COMPANIES AND PRESCRIBERS 
Considering past egregious conduct and the ongoing litigation, this Article 
focuses its empirical exercise on the current relationship between 
pharmaceutical companies and providers, as measured by legal, non-research-
related payments. Purely illegal transactions—the kind that tend to receive the 
most attention in plaintiffs’ complaints—are essentially unobservable. However, 
the connection between legal pharmaceutical payments and physician 
prescription patterns can serve as a proxy for the strength of the relationship 
between companies and prescribers.  
This Subpart provides the theoretical backbone on which the empirical 
analysis of the relationship between pharmaceutical payments and opioid 
prescription rates is built. It introduces two potential roles that pharmaceutical 
promotion to providers may play: a legitimately educational one and a 
persuasive one. It then distills these potential roles into clear hypotheses that will 
be tested in the empirical analysis. Although this analysis does not purport to 
establish any basis of liability for pharmaceutical companies, examining the 
legal payments from manufacturers to prescribers can provide important and 
relevant insight into the relationships that underlie allegations of liability in 
general. Understanding these relationships can also provide insight into legal, 
but troubling, connections between pharmaceutical companies and prescribers.  
A. THE THEORETICAL MECHANISMS FOR PHARMACEUTICAL INFLUENCE 
For obvious reasons, pharmaceutical companies do not publicize illegal 
activities or activities which may subject them to liability. Accordingly, this 
Article examines the prescriber-manufacturer relationship in the context of 
documented (and legal) non-research-related payments to physicians from 
pharmaceutical companies. In order to draw viable (and precise) conclusions 
from this type of data, certain assumptions underlying this approach are 
addressed. 
(1) Legal, non-research-related payments both represent a legal 
exchange and serve as a proxy for a pharmaceutical representative’s 
opportunity to spread information. 
This is the critical assumption for the following empirical exercise. The 
observable, legal payments serve not only as a measure of money received by 
physicians from pharmaceutical companies but also as a useful proxy for 
pharmaceutical promotion that provides opportunities to inform physicians 
about the safety and efficacy of a given drug.  
While this exercise assumes very little about the effect of documented 
payments and underlying activity, this analysis requires the following 
assumption: 
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(2) The amount of money exchanged is positively correlated with 
information exchanged.  
This argument is justified in one of two ways: (1) more money is correlated 
with more time to exchange information about the drug, and (2) more money is 
correlated with higher quality time to exchange information about the drug. In 
the first sense, more money spent on food and drink is correlated with a higher 
quantity of promotional visits. In the second sense, more money is spent on a 
higher quality of visit in the form of higher quality goods and services. 
Accordingly, the observable payments are proxies for pharmaceutical contact.  
Unfortunately, it is impossible to observe what transpires during such 
contact, particularly the informational content. Therefore, the type of 
informational content that is exchanged is separated into two categories: 
“legitimately educational” and “persuasive.”105 
(3) “Legitimately educational” information reflects purely unbiased 
assessments of opioid risk and benefits.  
If pharmaceutical representatives engage in “legitimately educational” 
promotion, they would merely communicate unbiased information about the 
safety and efficacy of opioids. Such unbiased information would have to include 
accurate representations of both the benefits and risks of opioids. An accurate 
representation of the benefits without an accurate representation of the risks 
cannot qualify as legitimately educational. No legitimate educational functions 
of payments from pharmaceutical companies to prescribers should raise red flags 
or serve as the basis for any liability in the current litigation.  
Notably, if the notion that pharmaceutical representatives engage in 
legitimately educational promotion is believed, recorded payments must be 
interpreted only as opportunities to present such unbiased education. If 
interpreted as having independent persuasive value, pharmaceutical 
representatives would no longer be solely offering legitimately educational 
conduct.  
(4) Information that does not qualify as “legitimately educational” is 
“persuasive.” 
Persuasive information exchanged by pharmaceutical representatives 
encompasses several degrees of misleading information. Persuasive information 
could merely be the accurate representation of the benefits of opioids without an 
accurate representation of the risks. It could also include an overoptimistic 
representation of benefits and risks. Importantly, persuasive information also 
encompasses entirely false and fraudulent information about risks and benefits. 
 
 105. These categories are undoubtedly difficult to differentiate in practice. However, we find this theoretical 
dichotomy useful, as each provides a clear empirical prediction. The empirical reality will be more mixed, but 
our average effects will indicate with which type of payment our results are most consistent.  
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Historically, this type of behavior has led to increased opioid prescription 
rates,106 and the continued existence of a strong and positive relationship 
between opioid-related payments and opioid-prescribing rates deep into the 
opioid crisis may be cause for continued concern. Indeed, this is one of the 
central allegations in many of the ongoing suits against opioid manufacturers.107  
In contrast to a legitimately educational promotion, under a persuasive 
paradigm, monetary values have a potentially independent effect on opioid 
prescription rates. That is, while payments could be merely an opportunity for 
pharmaceutical representatives to persuade physicians, they may also function 
as independent incentives to prescribe more opioids or reward already-high-
prescribing physicians. This leads to a subtle, but important, caveat. 
(5) This study does not distinguish between the use of payments to 
incentivize physicians to prescribe more and the use of payments to 
reward high-prescribing physicians.  
On one hand, manufacturers may encourage physicians to prescribe more 
opioids by providing incentives in the form of dinners or conferences. On the 
other hand, the positive association between opioid detailing and prescribing 
rates may represent less of an incentive-based scheme and more of a reward 
structure. For example, instead of targeting physicians that may respond to 
financial incentives or additional education materials, manufacturers may offer 
something akin to a reward for already high-prescribing physicians. Though not 
illegal in and of themselves, payments that serve these functions are consistent 
with various plaintiffs’ lawsuits—pharmaceutical companies established 
relationships with physicians that ultimately led to higher prescription rates.  
With these caveats in mind, this Subpart turns to the hypotheses generated 
from this theoretical model. The empirical analysis searches for evidence of a 
relationship between opioid-related payments by manufacturers and opioid-
prescribing rates by providers. Distinguishing between educational and 
incentivizing functions is not simple. The different functions of pharmaceutical 
payments, however, should be associated with different effects on opioid-
prescribing rates among providers receiving payments.  
If payments serve legitimately educational purposes, then higher levels of 
payments should only be correlated with more/better education. It is not clear 
that better education should be correlated with higher levels of prescribing. In 
some cases, better education may result in more opioids prescribed to patients 
who need them, but in others, more education may dissuade providers from 
inappropriately prescribing opioids. Indeed, as the 2016 guidelines on opioid 
 
 106. See supra Part I.B. 
 107. See supra Part I.C. 
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prescribing issued by the CDC demonstrate, a better understanding of how to 
prescribe opioids can often lead to lower prescription rates.108  
This is not to say that a positive correlation between payments and 
prescriptions is always inconsistent with legitimate education. If legitimately 
educational information was targeted mostly to physicians who should be 
prescribing high levels of opioids (perhaps due to the type of patients they treat), 
a mechanical correlation between payments and prescriptions might emerge. 
This would require a very targeted knowledge—not of physician prescription 
habits, but of the needs of the underlying population the physician serves.  
On the other hand, if payments serve primarily to encourage or reward 
higher prescribing rates, then a straightforward correlation should emerge: the 
receipt of more payments from pharmaceutical companies should be associated 
with higher opioid prescription rates. 
Hypothesis 1a: If there is no significant correlation between 
pharmaceutical payments and physician prescription, payments do not 
serve a persuasive function. 
Hypothesis 1b: If there is a significantly positive correlation between 
pharmaceutical payments and physician prescription, payments serve 
either a (1) persuasive function or (2) legitimately educational 
function directed only to physicians who should be high-volume opioid 
prescribers. 
By themselves, these hypotheses 1a–1b do not adequately distinguish 
between a legitimately educational and persuasive function of pharmaceutical 
payments. Accordingly, to gain better insight into the role of payments from 
pharmaceutical companies to physicians, changes in state informational laws 
must be used. As detailed in the next Subpart, these state laws provide the 
analytical leverage needed to explore more fully the role of payments on opioid 
prescription rates. 
B. CHANGES IN STATE PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM LAWS 
Given the severity of the opioid crisis, potential plaintiffs have not been 
alone in taking action. Policymakers and other stakeholders have come to 
appreciate the severity of the ongoing epidemic. They have proposed a number 
of legal, policy, and clinical interventions to forestall the deepening of the crisis. 
An exhaustive review of these efforts is well beyond the scope of this Article 
but understanding policies that may play a role in the prescriber-manufacturer 
relationship provides important context for this empirical analysis.  
Although the federal government has taken some steps to mitigate the 
opioid crisis,109 states have initiated most policies aimed at this crisis. The most 
 
 108. Deborah Dowell, Tamara M. Haegerich & Roger Chou, CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for 
Chronic Pain—United States, 2016, 65 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 1–15 (2016). 
 109. The federal government has passed several funding initiatives aimed at ameliorating the opioid 
epidemic. In 2016, the CDC issued a guideline on prescribing opioids for chronic pain. Id. at 1. This guideline 
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popular policy option to date has been the use of prescription drug monitoring 
programs (PDMPs).110 When implementing these programs, state governments 
establish a central repository of information on the prescription medications 
prescribed to individual patients and give providers access to this database.111 
State governments design these programs “to facilitate detection of suspicious 
prescribing and utilization.”112 The first PDMPs were created in the early 1900s, 
but modern PDMPs did not emerge until the late 20th and early 21st centuries.113 
These programs employ electronic data transmission to capture information on 
prescriptions and quickly disseminate that data to relevant stakeholders.114 Early 
programs offered only clumsy access to providers or were limited to law 
enforcement, but later adopting states designed their programs with providers in 
mind.115 However, even when providers could access the information contained 
in PDMPs relatively easily, they often declined to do so: administrative data 
suggests that only a small proportion of providers chose to obtain patient 
prescription histories from state PDMPs.116 Empirical evidence on these types 
of PDMPs demonstrates that, consistent with few providers accessing them, 
these programs had little impact on opioid prescriptions.117  
 
was “intended to . . . improve the safety and effectiveness of pain treatment, and reduce the risks associated with 
long-term opioid therapy, including opioid use disorder, overdose, and death.” Id. Evaluating the effectiveness 
of a national policy of this type is more difficult than evaluating state policies, but several years after the issuance 
of the CDC’s guideline, the opioid crisis did begin to abate. Hedegaard, supra note 1, at 1. 
 110. See Thomas C. Buchmueller & Colleen Carey, The Effect of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs 
on Opioid Utilization in Medicare, 10 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 77, 77 (2018) (noting that “nearly every state 
has implemented a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program”).  
 111. Id. at 77–78. 
 112. Id. at 77.  
 113. PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM TRAINING & TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR., HISTORY OF 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS 3–7 (2018), https://www.pdmpassist.org/pdf/PDMP_admin/ 
TAG_History_PDMPs_final_20180314.pdf. 
 114. See id. at 5 (“Taking advantage of emerging technology, Oklahoma (1990), broke the mold of previous 
PDMPs with its landmark legislation requiring electronic transmission of prescription data from a pharmacy 
directly to the state.”).  
 115. Id. (discussing the evolution of state PDMPs).  
 116. PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM CTR. OF EXCELLENCE AT BRANDEIS, MANDATING PDMP 
PARTICIPATION BY MEDICAL PROVIDERS: CURRENT STATUS AND EXPERIENCE IN SELECTED STATES 2 (2014), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/247134.pdf.  
 117. Ellen Meara, Jill R. Horwitz, Wilson Powell, Lynn McClelland, Weiping Zhou, A. James O’Malley & 
Nancy E. Morden, State Legal Restrictions and Prescription-Opioid Use Among Disabled Adults, 375 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 44, 50–52 (2016); Leonard J. Paulozz, Edwin M. Kilbourne & Hema A. Desai, Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Programs and Death Rates from Drug Overdose, 12 PAIN MED. 747, 750–52 (2011); Anupam B. 
Jena, Dana Goldman, Lesley Weaver & Pinar Karaca-Mandic, Opioid Prescribing by Multiple Providers in 
Medicare: Retrospective Observational Study of Insurance Claims, 348 BRITISH MED. J. 1, 4–5 (2014); Guohua 
Li, Joanne E. Brady, Barbara H. Lang, James Giglio, Hannah Wunsch & Charles DiMaggio, Prescription Drug 
Monitoring and Drug Overdose Mortality, 1 INJ. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1, 5–6 (2014); Joanne E. Brady, Hannah 
Wunsch, Charles DiMaggio, Barbara H. Lang, James Giglio & Guohua Li, Prescription Drug Monitoring and 
Dispensing of Prescription Opioids, 129 PUB. HEALTH REP. 139, 142–44 (2014); Tamara M. Haegerich, Leonard 
J. Paulozzi, Brian J. Manns & Christopher M. Jones, What We Know, and Don’t Know, About the Impact of 
State Policy and Systems-Level Interventions on Prescription Drug Overdose, 145 DRUG & ALCOHOL 
DEPENDENCE 34, 47–48 (2014). But see Liza M. Reifler, Danna Droz, J. Elise Bailey, Sidney H. Schnoll, 
Reginald Fant, Richard C. Dart & Becki Bucher Bartelson, Do Prescription Monitoring Programs Impact State 
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The current evolution of state PDMPs addressed the problem of providers 
not accessing patients’ prescription information.118 Currently, “[a]ll PDMPs 
allow access to their data by prescribers and dispensers.”119 And the vast 
majority of state programs now require providers to query prescription 
information before writing or dispensing a new prescription to a patient.120 This 
mandatory-access nature of PDMPs is relatively recent—only five states had 
mandated accessing a PDMP prior to prescribing in 2010—and is specifically 
designed to address the problem of providers not having relevant patient history 
before writing a new prescription.121 Research specific to these mandatory 
PDMPs has revealed consistent evidence that they effectively reduce opioid 
prescriptions.  
For example, Thomas Buchmueller and Colleen Carey examined a series 
of opioid misuse measures to determine the impact of mandatory PDMPs on 
patterns of opioid use. They found that “‘must access’ PDMPs reduce . . . the 
percentage of Medicare . . . enrollees who obtain prescriptions from five or more 
prescribers . . . by 8 percent and the percentage of enrollees who obtain 
prescriptions from five or more pharmacies by more than 15 percent.”122 Their 
research also revealed a negative relationship between the presence of a PDMP 
and opioid poisoning incidents.123 Similar research has “f[ou]nd evidence that 
mandatory PDMP access laws are effective in reducing [prescription] drug 
abuse, and in particular opioid abuse.”124 Another study concluded that “[r]obust 
PDMPs may be able to significantly reduce opioid dosages dispensed, 
percentages of patients receiving opioids, and high-risk prescribing,”125 and 
explained that PDMPs are only effective in reducing prescription rates “if they 
obligate doctors to check for patient history on the PDMP prior to filling out a 
 
Trends in Opioid Abuse/Misuse?, 13 PAIN MED. 434, 434 (2012) (“Results support an association between PMPs 
and mitigated opioid abuse and misuse trends.”).  
 118. PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM TRAINING & TECH. ASSISTANCE CTR., supra note 113, at 
7 (“Building on the experience and knowledge of earlier programs, more recent PDMPs have been implemented 
faster, employing best practices, and breaking new ground themselves in bringing PDMPs to their full 
potential.”). 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. (“In 2010, five (5) states (CO, DE, LA, NV and OK) had mandatory query laws, and today 40 states 
have such requirements.”).  
 121. Id.  
 122. Buchmueller & Carey, supra note 110, at 78–79.  
 123. Id. at 78–79.  
 124. Anca M. Grecu, Dhaval M. Dave & Henry Saffer, Mandatory Access Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Programs and Prescription Drug Abuse, 38 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 181, 183 (2019).  
 125. Rebecca L. Haffajee, Michelle M. Mello, Fang Zhang, Alan M. Zaslavsky, Marc R. Larochelle & J. 
Frank Wharam, Four States with Robust Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs Reduced Opioid Dosages, 37 
HEALTH AFFS. 964, 964 (2018).  
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prescription.”126 In general, this evidence supports an important role of 
mandatory PDMPs in curbing opioid prescriptions and opioid-related harms.127  
Recent research has investigated the effect of these programs on payments 
from pharmaceutical companies to prescribers by examining in more detail the 
role of PDMPs in curbing opioid prescriptions. A team led by Thuy Nguyen 
found evidence that mandatory access PDMPs reduce the amount companies 
expend in promoting opioids to prescribers.128 The researchers explain that their 
“results are consistent with economic theory, predicting lower promotional 
activities when return on investment decreases after state prescribing 
restrictions.”129 This evidence provides important support for the analysis 
conducted in this Article. By showing that PDMPs can impact the payments 
received by prescribers from pharmaceutical companies,130 Nguyen’s study 
highlights the ability of these laws to modulate the prescriber-manufacturer 
relationship. The following analysis takes the next step, investigating the role of 
PDMPs in this relationship in greater depth and tying this effect to the ongoing 
litigation described above.  
As a general matter, PDMPs may impact the prescriber-manufacturer 
relationship in several ways. First, and most importantly, PDMPs can correct 
misconceptions that physicians have about the undertreatment of pain, 
particularly misconceptions perpetuated by pharmaceutical detailing. Indeed, 
the purpose of PDMP laws is to provide more information to physicians so that 
they prescribe pain treatments more effectively. By providing physicians with 
an accurate count of the number of opioids their patients receive, physicians may 
better identify where pharmaceutical claims about the need for opioids deviate 
from objective evidence for their patients.  
Second, PDMP laws may reduce the amount of money pharmaceutical 
companies are willing to spend on physicians. Nguyen’s study found that the 
adoption of PDMP laws leads to a drop in the amount of pharmaceutical 
payments in the state.131 The authors explained that this drop in payments is 
consistent with pharmaceutical companies decreasing the amount they are 
willing to spend “when the return on investment decreases.”132  
 
 126. Ian Ayres & Amen Jalal, The Impact of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs on U.S. Opioid 
Prescriptions, 46 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 387, 397 (2018).  
 127. While the existing evidence clearly demonstrates an important role of mandatory PDMPs, recent 
research has noted that differences in dataset construction may have led to some differences in results across 
studies. Jill Horwitz, Corey S. Davis, Lynn S. McClelland, Rebecca S. Fordon & Ellen Meara, The Problem of 
Data Quality in Analyses of Opioid Regulation: The Case of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs 3 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24947, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24947. 
 128. Thuy D. Nguyen, W. David Bradford & Kosali I. Simon, How Do Opioid Prescribing Restrictions 
Affect Pharmaceutical Promotion? Lessons from the Mandatory Access Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Programs 23–37 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26356, 2019), https://www.nber.org/ 
system/files/working_papers/w26356/w26356.pdf. 
 129. Id. at 1.  
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.  
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Third, PDMPs may increase the cost (in the form of more liability) of 
prescribing more opioids from the perspective of providers. With a PDMP in 
place, physicians are required to check a patient’s prescription history and may 
be charged with constructive notice of this history.133 Accordingly, physicians’ 
expected liability may increase because it becomes easier to confirm the 
occurrence of over-prescription and prove that physicians knowingly 
overprescribe opioids.  
Given these effects of PDMPs, it is possible to leverage the presence of 
these programs to better understand the role of payments to prescribers. If these 
payments serve legitimately educational functions, then the presence of a PDMP 
should have little impact on the relationship between payments and prescribing 
rates. Consistent with the effects described above, PDMPs could certainly lower 
prescription rates generally, but this reduction should occur independently of the 
relationship between opioid payments and prescribing rates. In other words, an 
additional dollar paid to a prescriber in a state with a PDMP should have the 
same effect as an additional dollar paid to a prescriber in a state without a PDMP 
if these payments represent expenditures on legitimate educational 
opportunities.  
On the other hand, if pharmaceutical payments primarily serve a persuasive 
function, then PDMPs should modulate the effect of these payments on 
individual prescribers. If, as described above, PDMPs provide prescribers with 
more accurate information on which patients have received relatively large 
amounts of opioids, then these programs may correct misconceptions that 
patients are not over-prescribed opioids. In correcting these misconceptions, 
PDMPs may decrease the positive impact payments from companies have on 
opioid prescription rates. Similarly, if, as some research has suggested, 
companies find it less worthwhile to pay providers when PDMPs are in place, 
then prescribers may change their response to payments from manufacturers in 
the presence of a PDMP.134 Finally, as providers become attuned to their liability 
in the presence of PDMPs, they may be less willing to respond to the incentives 
offered by these programs because of the higher liability costs attached to doing 
so.  
Overall, the presence of PDMPs should have little impact on the effect of 
a payment from a manufacturer to a prescriber if these payments serve legitimate 
educational functions. However, if these payments primarily serve a persuasive 
function, then PDMPs should decrease the effectiveness of these payments such 
that a given payment in a state with a PDMP should increase opioid prescription 
rates less than in a state without a PDMP. This provides the second testable 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Conditional on observing a positive correlation between 
pharmaceutical payments, if payments serve a persuasive function, the 
 
 133. Buchmueller & Carey, supra note 110, at 82–86.  
 134. Nguyen et al., supra note 128, at 23–37. 
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implementation of PDMP laws will mitigate the correlation between 
payments and prescription rates. 
Accordingly, if a significant negative effect of PDMP laws is seen on the 
impact of pharmaceutical payments on prescriptions, this provides evidence that 
the original pharmaceutical influence is not legitimately educational but rather 
persuasive.  
Given these clear hypotheses, it is possible to empirically examine the role 
of payments from pharmaceutical companies to prescribers. The next Part 
describes the data and methodology used to test these hypotheses in detail. 
III.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
To examine the prescriber-manufacture relationship in the context of the 
ongoing opioid crisis, we conduct a groundbreaking empirical analysis. This 
Part begins by outlining the data and methodology used in that analysis.135 The 
analysis itself proceeds in two parts. We first examine the prescriber-
manufacturer relationship generally, testing whether payments from 
manufacturers to prescribers are associated with higher opioid-prescribing rates 
generally. The second phase of the analysis then examines whether PDMPs 
impact this relationship. This two-part analysis allows us to empirically test the 
hypotheses laid out in the previous Part.    
A. DATA ON THE PRESCRIBER-MANUFACTURER RELATIONSHIP 
As no dataset contains information on both opioid prescription rates and 
payments to prescribers from pharmaceutical companies, we created one for this 
study. We focus on the period of 2013–2017.136 In particular, we synthesized 
data during this period from three disparate sources, including the Medicare Part 
D Opioid Prescriber Summary File, the National Plan and Provider Enumeration 
System (NPPES), and the Open Payments dataset maintained by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services.137 The Medicare Part D Opioid Prescriber 
Summary File provides the percent of prescriptions consisting of opioids written 
by individual providers to Medicare beneficiaries each year between 2013 and 
 
 135. We provide a general discussion of our methodology and, in the interest of clarity and readability, 
reserve the more technical details of our analysis to the footnotes.  
 136. It bears noting that we are using data from the tail end of the opioid crisis; however, this will bias 
against finding statistically significant results. In view of the current litigation pressure and scrutiny, we expect 
that our estimation of the relationship is an underestimate of the historical relationship that existed at the height 
of the opioid crisis. 
 137. We examine these years because the Open Payments data begins in 2013, and the Medicare Part D data 
is only available until 2017 currently. See Dataset Downloads, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/OpenPayments/Explore-the-Data/Dataset-Downloads (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) 
(showing that available data begins with “Complete 2013 Program Year Open Payments Dataset”); Medicare 
Part D Opioid Prescriber Summary File, CMS DATA, https://data.cms.gov/browse?tags= 
opioidmap&sortBy=newest (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (filtering to show datasets for 2013 to 2017).  
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2017.138 Though this dataset is limited to Medicare beneficiaries, it has been 
used in policy evaluations in the past and represents the best available data on 
opioid prescriptions that can be obtained without triggering important 
confidentiality problems.139 The data in this file come from more granular data 
on Medicare patients but are organized in a way to protect the confidentiality of 
patients. This dataset identifies individual healthcare providers but does not 
provide a precise location. To obtain the location of individual providers, which 
is necessary to determine the applicability of various laws, we rely on the NPPES 
dataset. After merging these two datasets,140 we have a new dataset that includes 
the opioid prescription rates of all providers across the country and the location 
of each of these providers.141  
To obtain information on the payments made to these providers by 
pharmaceutical companies, we rely on the Open Payments dataset maintained 
by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The Affordable Care Act 
required the creation of this dataset to provide greater transparency in the 
prescriber-pharmaceutical company relationships.142 Any time a pharmaceutical 
or medical device manufacturer “provides a payment or other transfer of value” 
to a provider, that manufacturer must report, inter alia, the name of the provider, 
the amount of the payment, the date of the payment, and “[a] description of the 
nature of the payment or other transfer of value.”143 A dataset containing 
information on all such payments must then be made publicly available. We rely 
on this “Open Payments” dataset to glean information on legal payments made 
by pharmaceutical companies to prescribers.  
The Open Payments dataset provides rich information on the number of 
payments received by each provider by name and full address. However, not all 
of these payments are relevant to opioid prescriptions. Therefore, we filter many 
of these payments out of the data. First, we only consider general payments, not 
payments associated with research, in order to capture non-research influence 
 
 138. Medicare Part D Opioid Prescriber Summary File, supra note 137. Because the Medicare prescription 
data reports opioid claims counts between 1 and 10 as missing, we impute any missing values as 5.5. We then 
recompute the opioid prescription rate for these providers and impute that for missing values of the opioid 
prescription rate. We treat reported zeros as true zeros.  
 139. Ashley C. Bradford & W. David Bradford, The Impact of Medical Cannabis Legalization on 
Prescription Medication Use and Costs under Medicare Part D, 61 J.L. & ECON. 461, 468 (2018). 
 140. Both the Medicare prescription dataset and NPPES dataset include the national provider identifier 
(“NPI”) number of each provider. Medicare Part D Opioid Prescriber Summary File, supra note 137; NPI Files, 
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://download.cms.gov/nppes/NPI_Files.html (last visited Feb. 
25, 2021). We rely on the NPI to accurately match the two datasets.  
 141. While our sample is limited to Medicare claims, physicians treating Medicare patients also often treat 
non-Medicare patients. See Benjamin J. McMichael, R. Lawrence Van Horn & W. Kip Viscusi, The Impact of 
Cannabis Access Laws on Opioid Prescribing, 69 J. HEALTH ECON. 1, 12 (2020) (examining prescribing patterns 
that evince physicians treating patients with different types of insurance). Insofar as these treatment patterns are 
not wholly distinct, our results can be informative of non-Medicare patients. Even if this were not the case, 
however, Medicare patients constitute a politically-important subgroup and the empirical relationship reflects 
issues of significant public concern.  
 142. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7h. 
 143. Id. § 1320a-7h(a)(1)(A).  
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over providers.144 Second, since we are only interested in the incentive effects 
of such payments on opioid prescriptions, we only consider payments relating 
to products considered opioids. To ensure that we only examine payments 
related to opioids, we use a list of opioid product names maintained by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to classify drugs appearing in the 
Open Payments dataset145 as opioids.146 Given the complex structure of the data, 
we employ a sophisticated algorithm to filter these observations.147 The result is 
a dataset that contains detailed information on the non-research-related 
payments each prescriber received from opioid manufacturers between 2013 and 
2017.  
Matching the Open Payments data to the Medicare prescribing data is not 
straightforward,148 and a key innovation of this Article is merging information 
on opioid prescription rates from the Medicare dataset to the information on 
payments from the Open Payments dataset. Because the structure of the datasets 
differs substantially, we implement sophisticated matching algorithms to match 
prescription data to pharmaceutical payment data. Though difficult to create and 
implement, the result of these sophisticated matching programs is a dataset 
containing information on the payments made by pharmaceutical companies to 
 
 144. We take all observations as given and do not make any adjustments based on “Change” status. 
 145. Each year of Open Payments lists a number of drugs, devices, or supplies associated with the payment; 
if any of the products are considered opioids, we count the payment as an opioid payment. See About 
OpenPayments, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/OpenPayments/About/About 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
 146. CDC Compilation of Benzodiazepines, Muscle Relaxants, Stimulants, Zolpidem, and Opioid 
Analgesics with Oral Morphine Milligram Equivalent Conversion Factors, 2017 Version, CDC, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data-files/CDC_Oral_Morphine_Milligram_Equivalents_Sept_2017.xlsx 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2021). We do not consider product names associated with buprenorphine, as it treats 
addiction to narcotic pain relievers. See Christopher Welsh & Adela Valadez-Meltzer, Buprenorphine: A 
(Relatively) New Treatment for Opioid Dependence, 2 PSYCHIATRY 29, 31 (2005).  
 147. Using the software Python, we construct a set of opioid product names. After extracting the products 
associated with each payment, the program checks whether there is any overlap between the extracted product 
names and the set of opioid product names. If there is, we count the payment as an opioid-related payment.  
 148. The inherent difficulty in matching prescription data to Open Payments lies in the fact that Open 
Payments data do not include NPI numbers. See Dataset Downloads, supra note 136. Accordingly, we must 
match payments to prescriptions using name and office address. This is not a simple issue of merging data, as 
random misspellings and inconsistent abbreviations make both names and addresses not uniform. For example, 
a physician named “John Smith, 1234 Main St., Tallahassee, FL 32306” in the prescription data may be under 
“John M. Smith, 1234 Main Street, Suite 302, Tallahassee, FL 32306” in the Open Payments data. Moreover, 
sometimes physicians are associated with multiple addresses or versions of their names in a given dataset. We 
address these challenges using a combination of data manipulation techniques and string-analysis algorithms. 
Specifically, we aggregate total payments for opioids by unique provider number provided by Open Payments. 
(Note that this unique ID number does not correspond to NPI number). While we aggregate total payments for 
each physician, we associated this aggregate payment with every address the physician is listed by, so that we 
have a higher likelihood of matching them to whatever address they have listed in the prescription data. We 
compile all of these payments into a data dictionary. We then use the name and mailing address for each 
observation in the prescription data to look up the associated payment in the Open Payments data in two steps. 
We first attempt to use name and the first line of the address to find an exact match in the Open Payments data 
dictionary. If there is not a perfect match, we look at possible providers in the same state and city as the prescriber 
and use fuzzy matching on name and first line of the business mailing address to obtain the relevant payment. 
We do the fuzzy matching using a Python package designed for this purpose. 
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individual physicians and the opioid prescriptions written by those individual 
physicians. 
This matched dataset is the subject of our empirical analysis detailed 
below. However, to complete all phases of that analysis, we augment the dataset 
with several other key pieces of information. First, we construct a variable that 
indicates whether a provider practiced in a state with a law mandating that 
providers check the state’s PDMP before prescribing controlled substances 
(which includes all opioids).149 Second, we construct a variable indicating 
whether a state had a law authorizing adults to use medical cannabis in a similar 
fashion.150 We include information on cannabis access laws because prior work 
has shown that they can have a significant impact on opioid prescription rates.151 
Thus, controlling for them will better allow us to isolate the role of payments 
from companies to prescribers.  
Our final dataset contains information on opioid prescription rates,152 
pharmaceutical payments, state PDMP laws, and state cannabis access laws. 
This dataset is organized at the level of the individual provider,153 providing us 
with comprehensive and highly accurate information on the relationships 
between pharmaceutical companies and individual providers. In particular, we 
can quantify the following relationships: (1) the effect of pharmaceutical 
payments on opioid prescriptions rates, and (2) how state PDMP laws may 
mitigate this effect. The following Subpart describes the empirical analysis of 
these relationships in detail.  
 
 149. Information on the dates of adoption of state PDMPs comes from the Prescription Drug Abuse Policy 
System. Legal Science, PDMP Reporting and Authorized Use, PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE POL’Y SYS., 
http://pdaps.org/datasets/prescription-monitoring-program-laws-1408223416-1502818373 (last visited Feb. 25, 
2021). We downloaded the data on December 11, 2019, and used policies indicated as “must-access.” We round 
the policy dates to the nearest year (that is, if date is on or prior to July 1, 1999, the year of enactment is 1999. 
If the date is after July 1, 1999, the year of enactment is 2000). The policy variable takes the value of one in the 
enactment year and afterwards.  
 150. We similarly rely on information provided by the Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System to determine 
which states allowed access to medical cannabis and the dates on which that access began. Legal Science, 
Medical Marijuana Laws for Patients, PRESCRIPTION DRUG ABUSE POL’Y SYS., http://pdaps.org/datasets/ 
medical-marijuana-patient-related-laws-1501600783 (last visited Feb. 25, 2021). 
 151. McMichael et al., supra note 141, at 1. 
 152. The opioid prescription rate is defined as the number of opioid claims divided by total claims (by 
physician), multiplied by 100.  
 153. During the period analyzed here, only payments to physicians were required to be reported to the Open 
Payments dataset. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to physicians in this Article. The laws have since been 
changed and future iterations of the Open Payments dataset (beginning in 2022) will include detailed payment 
information for other providers, such as nurse practitioners and physician assistants. Law and Policy, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/OpenPayments/About/Law-and-Policy (last visited Feb. 
25, 2021). 
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B. METHODOLOGY 
To analyze the connection between pharmaceutical payments and 
physician opioid prescription rates, we estimate a series of regression models.154 
These models allow us to measure the average effect of pharmaceutical 
payments on opioid prescription while controlling for other confounding effects. 
In particular, the estimated models net out the effect of time-invariant 
differences across states. These differences may include different licensing 
requirements or the different approaches of medical boards to the opioid crisis. 
These, and many other factors that differ across states lines, may impact opioid 
prescription rates. By controlling for these various factors,155 our models allow 
us to isolate the effect of payments from manufacturers on opioid prescription 
rates.  
Our models also control for differences across time. In general, the CDC 
has noted that the opioid crisis has followed a clear trend, and controlling for the 
various factors within this trend is critical if we are to isolate the role of payments 
from other factors. Our models include these types of controls.156 Finally, we 
allow for differences in prescription rates by different specialties.157 Controlling 
for differences across specialties is important because certain specialties 
prescribe more opioids than others for legitimate medical reasons.158 By 
controlling for all of these factors, our models can isolate the variation in opioid 
prescription rates that is attributable to pharmaceutical payments.159  
Turning to the details of the models, the outcome we examine throughout 
our analysis is the opioid prescription rate of individual providers. While this 
outcome measure is straightforward—we simply examine the percent of 
prescriptions written that constitute opioid prescriptions160—measuring 
manufacturer payments is less so. In particular, prior research has suggested that 
 
 154. Throughout our analysis, we estimate ordinary least squares regression models with the following 
general specification: 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦𝛽 +	𝜕! + 𝛾" + 𝜃# + 𝜀. The dependent variable, 
OpioidRate, is the average number of opioids a physician prescribes across all of his or her patients each year. 
PaymentCategory is a vector of indicator variables that capture the amount of payments received by individual 
physicians. This series of variables is described in more detail below. All of our regression models also include 
fixed effects for state (𝛾"), year (𝜕!), and specialty (𝜃#). Standard errors are clustered by state.  
 155. Specifically, the inclusion of state fixed effects controls for observable and unobservable differences 
across states.  
 156. Specifically, the inclusion of year fixed effects control for linear and non-liner temporal trends in opioid 
prescription rates.  
 157. We use specialty data reported in Medicare Part D Opioid Prescriber Summary File. Medicare Part D 
Opioid Prescriber Summary File, supra note 137.   
 158. The specialty fixed effects control for differences across specialties.  
 159. In general, with ordinary lease squares (OLS) regressions, there is always a possibility that an omitted 
variable that is correlated with pharmaceutical payments is actually impacting opioid prescriptions. This is 
particularly problematic when a causal relationship is being inferred. However, here, we are not interested in 
eliciting causality; we are instead interested in how physician prescriptions vary with physician payments.  
 160. The prescription rate is defined as the number of opioid claims divided by total claims, multiplied by 
100. This can be interpreted as the average opioid claims for every 100 claims. While there are potentially other 
measures we could use for our dependent variable, since our analysis is physician-centric, not patient-centric, 
the rate per 100 claims seems most reflective of physician behavior.  
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pharmaceutical payments have a lasting effect on physician prescription 
decisions.161 In light of this, we focus not on the amount a physician receives in 
a given year, but on the cumulative payments they have received over the years 
in our sample.  
For example, in 2013, our cumulative payment variable will include 
payments from 2013. However, in 2014, the cumulative payment variable will 
include payments to a given physician from both 2013 and 2014. This allows us 
to differentiate between one-off payments and longer relationships. Using these 
cumulative payments, we place prescribers into one of six categories based on 
the number of payments they have received. The lowest category includes all 
prescribers who received no opioid-related payments. We then classify all 
providers who received at least one opioid-related payment from a manufacturer 
into five separate, equally-sized categories.162 Physicians with the highest levels 
of payments appear in the fifth category, those with the next highest levels of 
payments in the fourth category, and so on.  
Based on these categories, we create a series of variables that indicate the 
category each falls into. These indicator variables capture the relationship 
between manufacturer payments and opioid prescription rates. For example, the 
variable indicating the highest category captures the effect of being among the 
most well-paid providers on opioid prescription rates. The variable indicating 
the lowest (positive) category captures the effect of receiving some, but not 
substantial, payments. While this approach is somewhat more complex than 
simply examining payment rates themselves, it is mathematically preferable 
because it avoids imposing any assumptions of strict linearity on the effect of 
payments. We expect that the effect of payments on prescriptions will vary by 
category, and the nature of this variation will allow us to evaluate the various 
hypotheses outlined above.  
The methodology described so far underlies the first phase of our analysis 
that investigates the general relationship between payments and opioid 
prescription rates. We also rely on this methodology in the second phase, but we 
augment it using information on PDMPs. We describe this augmentation in 




 161. Svetlana N. Beilfuss, Pharmaceutical Opioid Marketing and Physician Prescribing Behavior 19 (Oct. 
26, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://svetlanabeilfuss.com/uploads/1/2/1/5/121526954/jobmarketpaper_ 
svetlananbeilfuss.pdf. 
 162. These categories are defined for each state and year. Thus, a physician whose cumulative payment is 
in the highest tier in his state in a given state and year might fall into a different tier in a different state or year. 
Because pharmaceutical companies separate markets geographically, allowing for different rankings by state is 
important. As there might be differences in yearly spending by pharmaceutical companies (and to account for 
the ratcheting effect of using cumulative payments), cumulative payments are only compared to other cumulative 
payments in a given year. 
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C. RESULTS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHARMACEUTICAL 
PAYMENTS AND OPIOID PRESCRIPTIONS 
We begin our analysis by focusing generally on the relationship between 
opioid-related payments by manufacturers and opioid prescription rates. Before 
delving into the details of our empirical models, however, Figures 1 and 2 
present an overview of the prevalence of opioid prescriptions and opioid 
detailing, respectively. These figures are not intended to demonstrate the 
correlation between opioid prescription and pharmaceutical payments. Indeed, 
since our empirical analysis measures the relationship between opioid 
prescription rates and relative payment tiers within states in a given year, the 
maps necessarily will not preview our empirical results. Instead, these maps 
present some idea of geographical variation in both payments and prescriptions.  
 
Figure 1. Opioid Prescription Rates Across the United States 
 
As such, Figure 1 reports the average opioid-prescribing rate for physicians 
in each state across our entire data period. This rate varies from a low of 8.12 
opioid prescriptions per 100 prescriptions to a high of 14.46 opioid prescriptions. 
Interestingly, the regions with the highest-prescribing providers include the 
Southern, Mountain, and Pacific Northwest states—a group of states that often 
have little in common with one another. In contrast, states in the Northeast and 
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Figure 2. Opioid-Related Payments Across the United States 
 
Figure 2 reports the average opioid-related payment rate in each state 
across our entire data period. As with opioid-prescribing rates, physicians in the 
southern states and mountain states place higher in the distribution of opioid 
payments than physicians in other states. While the correlation between states in 
the highest categories of opioid-prescribing rates and opioid payments is not 
one-to-one, Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that states receiving more opioid 
detailing tend to have higher opioid-prescribing rates.   
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Figure 3. Opioid Prescriptions by Opioid-Related Payment Category 
Figure 3 presents more detailed information on the relationship between 
opioid-related payments and opioid-prescribing rates. In particular, it reports the 
mean opioid-prescribing rate of physicians who received different amounts of 
opioid-related payments from pharmaceutical companies. At the lowest end of 
the payment spectrum are those physicians who received no opioid payments 
(highlighted in red). These physicians also, on average, had the lowest opioid-
prescribing rates. Among the physicians who received some amount of opioid-
related payments, Figure 3 divides those physicians into five categories, as 
described above. Physicians in the first category received the least amount of 
money, while those in the fifth received the highest amount. As Figure 3 
illustrates, the mean opioid-prescribing rate generally increases across the 
categories. In other words, the more opioid-related payments received by a 
physician, the more opioids that physician prescribed.  
To explore the relationship between opioid payments and prescribing rates 
further, we estimate a series of regression models. In the interest of succinctness, 
we report the results graphically. Figure 4163 reports the results of a model 
exploring the general relationship between payment levels and prescription 
rates. The horizontal axis reports the level of payments received by each 
physician. At the lowest level are those physicians who received no payments 
from opioid manufacturers. Physicians who received some amount of money 
 
 163. The vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals, though these coefficients are all significant at the 
5% significance levels as well. 
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from opioid manufacturers are, as before, divided into five categories. The 
vertical axis tracks the change in physicians’ opioid-prescribing rates associated 
with being in a particular payment category.  
 
Figure 4. Effect of Pharmaceutical Payment on Opioid Prescription Rate 
 
Figure 4 demonstrates an increasing relationship between receiving 
payments from opioid manufacturers and opioid prescriptions rates. Physicians 
that received no payments from opioid companies serve as the baseline.164 Each 
successive category is associated with a higher opioid prescription rate relative 
to this baseline. However, much of the effect of opioid detailing is concentrated 
in the fourth and fifth categories. For example, the first payment category is 
associated with approximately 0.2 additional opioid prescriptions per 100 
prescriptions than the no-payment baseline. However, the fourth category is 
associated with two additional opioid prescriptions per 100 prescriptions. The 
fifth payment category is associated with over ten additional opioid prescriptions 
per 100 prescriptions than the no-payment baseline. 
While the associations reported in Figure 4 do not necessarily represent the 
causal effect of opioid-related payments on opioid-prescribing rates, these 
 
 164. This is not to suggest that physicians that receive no payments do not prescribe opioids. They do. The 
rate at which these physicians prescribe opioids simply serves as the basis of comparison. Each reported effect 
for the separate payment quintiles represents the change in opioid-prescribing rates relative to physicians who 
received no payments.  
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results provide important insight into the hypotheses outlined above. In general, 
we find no evidence that payments are unrelated to prescribing rates. Instead, 
we find consistent evidence that the more money prescribers receive from opioid 
manufacturers, the more opioids they prescribe. This relationship is not linear, 
and physicians in the highest payment category are much more affected by 
payments than are physicians in the lowest category. Indeed, the increase of ten 
opioid prescriptions per 100 prescriptions observed in connection with the 
highest payment category represents an approximately ninety percent increase 
from the baseline physicians who received no opioid-related payments.165 
These results provide clear support for Hypothesis 1b—the hypothesis that 
higher opioid-related payments are associated with higher opioid-prescription 
rates. In other words, the results reveal a consistent positive relationship between 
payments and prescribing rates. As noted before, this positive relationship does 
not, by itself, demonstrate that opioid-related payments serve a persuasive 
purpose. The positive correlation may be an artifact of purely educational 
payments as long as those payments are concentrated only on physicians who 
should be prescribing high levels of opioids. There are potential reasons for this 
to be the case—pharmaceutical representatives may have useful information 
about the type of patient populations each physician serves. If representatives 
target only physicians whose patients need opioids for unbiased education, the 
positive relationship observed here could arise absent any kind of deleterious 
behavior on the part of opioid manufacturers. Of course, as noted in Hypothesis 
1b, this positive relationship is also consistent with pharmaceutical payments 
performing a persuasive role in physician treatment. To discern between these 
two functions, we extend our analysis to examine the role of PDMPs. The next 
Subpart discusses that extended analysis.  
D. RESULTS FOR THE ROLE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAMS 
We focus on the role of PDMPs in mitigating the payment-prescribing 
relationship revealed by the results above. PDMPs were originally designed to 
provide prescribers with more information about medications patients had 
previously received.166 For example, a physician may decline to prescribe 
opioids if she has credible information that the patient requesting the 
prescription has already received three other opioid prescriptions from other 
physicians. In accomplishing this primary purpose, however, PDMPs can also 
(if unintentionally) affect the ability of opioid manufacturers to influence 
physician prescription patterns.  
If physicians are generally unaware of how prevalent opioid prescription 
is, the enactment of a PDMP law may reduce prescription rates generally across 
all tiers of payments. However, if opioid-related payments serve legitimate 
 
 165. As indicated in Figure 2, the baseline group of physicians prescribed approximately eleven opioids per 
100 prescriptions. 
 166. Buchmueller & Carey, supra note 110, at 82–86.  
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educational functions, then the presence of a PDMP should have no impact on 
the relationship between payments and prescribing rates. In this state of the 
world, manufacturers are not using payments to incentivize over-prescription 
and are instead disseminating unbiased information about opioid risk and 
benefits. As such, the informational value that PDMPs add should not cause 
physicians receiving pharmaceutical payments (“education”) to revise their 
prescription decisions relative to physicians who do not receive payments. 
Accordingly, there should be no mitigating effect on the relationship between 
pharmaceutical payments and prescriptions.  
On the other hand, if opioid-related payments serve persuasive functions—
persuasion which may involve false or misleading advertising—then PDMPs 
should have a clear effect on the relationship between payments and prescribing 
rates. In this state of the world, a physician who has received credible 
information from a PDMP about a patient may be less likely to believe 
manufacturers’ claims about the low risk of addiction associated with chronic 
opioid use or claims about the undertreatment of pain.167 Similarly, PDMPs have 
the potential to expose physicians who prescribe excessively to unwanted 
attention and even liability. If this is the case, then the additional prescriptions 
associated with a payment category in states with PDMPs should be smaller than 
those in states without these programs. In other words, being in the same 
category of payment in a state with a PDMP should induce a smaller uptick in 
opioid prescriptions than in a state without a PDMP. Based on Hypothesis 2, we 
would then expect that the existence of a PDMP law will mitigate the 
relationship between pharmaceutical payments and prescriptions. 
Accordingly, by examining the impact of PDMPs on the relationship 
between payments and prescription rates, it is possible to understand the nature 
of these payments better: do they further legitimate goals, or do they simply 
incentivize more prescriptions? To formally test the impact of PDMPs, we 
estimate the same regression model that underlies Figure 4, above. Now, 
however, we include a variable that indicates whether a prescriber practiced in 
a state that maintained a mandatory-access PDMP. We interact this variable with 
all of the variables indicating which payment category a physician fell into.168 
By doing so, we can estimate the effect of payments on providers who must 
access a PDMP relative to those that do not have to access a PDMP under state 
law.  
Like Figure 4, Figure 5 graphically reports the changes in prescriptions by 
pharmaceutical payment category, relative to physicians receiving no payment. 
Unlike Figure 4, Figure 5 allows this effect to differ between states and years in 
 
 167. For a discussion of the allegations made by plaintiffs in connection with these alleged false 
advertisements, see supra Part I.C.  
 168. Specifically, we estimated the following model: 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦′𝛽 + 𝛼𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑃 +
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑥𝑃𝐷𝑀𝑃′𝛿	+	𝜕! + 𝛾" + 𝜃# + 𝜀, with fixed effects for state (𝛾"), year (𝜕!), and specialty (𝜃#). 
Standard errors are clustered by state. For category i, the plotted treatment effect for the non-PDMP line is 𝛽$, 
while the plotted effect for the PDMP line is 𝛽$ + 𝛿$. The vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. 
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which a PDMP law is in effect and those in which no PDMP is in effect. If 
PDMP laws disrupt the existing relationship between pharmaceutical payments 
and prescriptions, the PDMP line should be significantly lower than the non-
PDMP line. Figure 5 indicates that the effect of pharmaceutical payment level is 
smaller when a PDMP is in place. This effect is statistically significant for all 
categories except for the second.169 Thus, not only are PDMP laws generally 
associated with fewer opioid prescriptions, the reduction is concentrated in 
physicians receiving pharmaceutical payments. Furthermore, the effect becomes 
more pronounced in the higher categories of payments, with physicians in the 
fifth category seeing a bigger effect on the payment-prescription rate 
relationship than those in lower categories. 
 
Figure 5. Effect of Pharmaceutical Payment  
on Opioid Prescription Rate, by PDMP Status 
In general, the results reported in Figure 5 demonstrate that PDMPs 
significantly impact the relationship between payments and prescription rates in 
ways that do not support a legitimately educational function for opioid-related 
payments. Stated differently, the results provide support for Hypothesis 2. While 
the results do not clearly indicate the mechanism by which PDMPs have their 
effect, any effect is consistent with payments serving a persuasive role.  
 
 169. The difference in effect is significant at the 10% level for the first, third, fourth, and fifth categories. 
The difference in effect is also significant at the 5% significance level for the first, fourth, and fifth categories. 
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Before exploring the implications of this critically important result, we first 
test its robustness. In particular, we re-estimate the same model reported in 
Figure 5 but include additional controls for medical cannabis access laws. One 
relevant set of policies that have proven effective at addressing the harms 
associated with the opioid crisis has been cannabis access laws, even though 
these laws were never designed to do so. States that have loosened restrictions 
on access to cannabis, either through laws legalizing medical cannabis or 
providing access to cannabis for personal or recreational use, have seen 
reductions in both opioid use and opioid-related harms.170 Cannabis access laws 
accomplish these reductions via a different mechanism than PDMPs, however. 
Where PDMPs provide prescribers additional information to combat drug-
seeking behavior and reduce inappropriate opioid prescriptions, laws facilitating 
access to cannabis do so by decreasing the demand for opioids as individuals 
substitute cannabis for opioids.171  
Insofar as medical cannabis is a substitute for opioid in terms of pain 
management,172 the enactment of laws that allow for legal consumption of 
 
 170. McMichael et al., supra note 141, at 10; Marcus A. Bachhuber, Brendan Saloner, Chinazo O. 
Cunningham & Colleen L. Barry, Medical Cannabis Laws and Opioid Analgesic Overdose Mortality in the 
United States, 1999–2010, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1668, 1671 (2014).  
 171. See James M. Corroon Jr., Laurie K. Mischley & Michelle Sexton, Cannabis as a Substitute for 
Prescription Drugs—A Cross-Sectional Study, 10 J. PAIN RSCH. 989, 989 (2017) (finding that nearly 50% of 
patients substitute cannabis for prescription drugs and that the most commonly substituted drugs are prescription 
opioids); Michelle Sexton, Carrie Cutler, John S. Finnell & Laurie K. Mischley, A Cross-Sectional Survey of 
Medical Cannabis Users: Patterns of Use and Perceived Efficacy, 1 CANNABIS & CANNABINOID RSCH. 131, 133 
(2016) (“In response to the question ‘Have you have ever used cannabis as a substitute for prescription drugs?’ 
59.8% of participants responded yes. When asked which drugs they substitute Cannabis for, over 25% of these 
participants reported substituting Cannabis for pain medications, including opiates.”); Kevin F. Boehnke, 
Evangelos Litinas & Daniel J. Clauw, Medical Cannabis Use Is Associated with Decreased Opiate Medication 
Use in a Retrospective Cross-Sectional Survey of Patients with Chronic Pain, 17 J. PAIN 739, 739 (2016) 
(“Among study participants, medical cannabis use was associated with a 64% decrease in opioid use.”); Amanda 
Reiman, Mark Welty & Perry Solomon, Cannabis as a Substitute for Opioid-Based Pain Medication: Patient 
Self-Report, 2 CANNABIS & CANNABINOID RSCH. 160, 162–64 (2017) (“Ninety-two percent of the sample 
‘strongly agreed/agreed’ that they prefer cannabis to opioids for the treatment of their condition and 93% 
‘strongly agreed/agreed’ that they would be more likely to choose cannabis to treat their condition if it were 
more readily available.”).  
 172. For example, early work demonstrated that medical cannabis laws reduced the use of prescription drugs 
for which cannabis can serve as a substitute among Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. Ashley C. Bradford 
& W. David Bradford, Medical Marijuana Laws Reduce Prescription Medication Use in Medicare Part D, 35 
HEALTH AFFS. 1230, 1233–35 (2016); Ashley C. Bradford & W. David Bradford, Medical Marijuana Laws May 
Be Associated with a Decline in the Number of Prescriptions for Medicaid Enrollees, 36 HEALTH AFFS. 945, 
948–50 (2017). Later work, which focused more explicitly on opioids, yielded evidence that medical cannabis 
access laws reduce opioid prescriptions among Medicare beneficiaries by between 8% and 21% across six 
different types of opioids. Bradford & Bradford, supra note 139, at 476–82. Similarly, medical cannabis access 
laws and adult use cannabis access laws reduced opioid prescriptions among Medicaid beneficiaries by 5.88% 
and 6.38%, respectively. Hefei Wen & Jason M. Hockenberry, Association of Medical and Adult-Use Marijuana 
Laws with Opioid Prescribing for Medicaid Enrollees, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 673, 673 (2018); see also Di 
Liang, Yuhua Bao, Mark Wallace, Igor Grant & Yuyan Shi, Medical Cannabis Legalization and Opioid 
Prescriptions: Evidence on US Medicaid Enrollees During 1993–2014, 113 ADDICTION 2060, 2063–68 (2018) 
(finding that medical cannabis access laws reduced opioid prescriptions among the Medicaid population). 
Focusing on the general population—and not just individuals covered by Medicare or Medicaid, a recent study 
concluded that recreational cannabis access laws and medical cannabis access laws reduced opioid prescriptions 
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marijuana might influence the relationship between pharmaceutical payments 
and prescriptions. To ensure that cannabis access laws do not influence the 
difference in payment effect for PDMP observations and non-PDMP 
observations, we control for the enactment of these laws. Figure 6173 reports the 
results from models that include controls for medical cannabis access laws. The 
results are quite similar to those reported in Figure 5. Accordingly, our 
conclusions about the effect of PDMPs on the relationship between payments 
and prescription rates are not impacted by the availability of medical cannabis. 
Given the strength of our results, and the fact that these results demonstrate a 
persuasive function of opioid-related payments—in technical terms, we find 
support for both Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 2—we explore the implications 
of these results in the next Part. 
 
Figure 6. Effect of Pharmaceutical Payment on Opioid 




(as measured in morphine milligram equivalents) by 11.8% and 4.2%, respectively. McMichael et al., supra note 
141, at 1. 
 173. The difference in effect is significant at the 10% level for the first, third, fourth, and fifth categories. 
The difference in effect is also significant at the 5% significance level for the first, fourth, and fifth categories. 
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IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN PAYMENTS AND 
PRESCRIPTIONS 
With the explosion of lawsuits against opioid manufacturers in recent 
years, understanding the relationships between these manufacturers and the 
healthcare providers who prescribe their products has never been more 
important. The results of our empirical analysis provide unique insight into these 
continuing—and troubling—relationships. In this Part, we begin by exploring 
the nature of these relationships as elucidated by the empirical analysis above 
and contextualizing our results within the ongoing opioid litigation. We then 
explore the (unintended) policy implications raised by our results.  
A. CONTEXTUALIZING THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
Given the sheer number of claims that comprise the ongoing opioid 
litigation, it comes as no surprise that no single theory of liability underlies every 
claim. However, as discussed above, two theories of liability that permeate many 
suits are that (1) opioid manufacturers engaged in false or misleading advertising 
and (2) instead of reporting suspicious orders, opioid manufacturers targeted 
high-prescribing physicians for additional detailing.174 The results of our 
empirical analysis above are generally consistent with both theories of liability. 
Indeed, even examining data on legal payments demonstrates the continued 
existence of troubling relationships between manufacturers and prescribers. 
Moreover, these are the types of relationships that must be present if either of 
these general theories can support liability on the part of manufacturers. Without 
a strong connection between manufacturers and prescribers, it would prove 
exceedingly difficult for manufacturers to offer false or misleading 
advertisements to prescribers convincingly. Similarly, the types of relationships 
highlighted by our results are the types that one would expect to see if, instead 
of monitoring and reporting unusual shipments, opioid manufacturers were 
targeting prescribers for increased opioid prescriptions.  
Importantly, the results of our empirical analysis suggest that not only does 
a significant relationship exist between pharmaceutical payments and opioid 
prescription rates, but that this relationship has persisted through the latter part 
of the opioid crisis.175 The continuation of this relationship into the later years 
of the crisis—when drugs such as heroin and fentanyl have played larger roles 
than prescription opioids—suggests that the behavior of pharmaceutical 
companies plays an important role in physicians’ decisions to prescribe opioids. 
While the evidence reported above does not necessarily demonstrate any 
behavior that would subject manufacturers to criminal or civil liability, the 
 
 174. See supra Part I.C. 
 175. As previously mentioned, these results are not meant to estimate the causal effect of an additional dollar 
on prescription rates. Instead, the results document correlations between the prescription rates and payment tiers 
and describe how these correlations change in the presence of PDMP laws. The implications of these patterns 
correspond to the predictions of payments serving persuasive functions rather than purely educational ones.  
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strong and continued relationship between pharmaceutical company payments 
and physician opioid prescriptions suggests that these companies continue to 
encourage opioid prescriptions deep into the opioid crisis.  
Not only does the association between payments and prescribing rates 
remain statistically significant despite the presence of illegal alternatives, such 
as heroin and illicitly manufactured fentanyl, the magnitude of this association 
increases with the tier of spending. This increase is consistent with the notion 
that physicians receiving much larger payments from pharmaceutical companies 
are affected in a qualitatively different way than those receiving minimal 
amounts.  
In general, this pattern of effects may be consistent either with payments 
serving legitimate educational functions or with payments serving to encourage 
more opioid prescriptions. The second phase of our analysis, however, 
demonstrates that the latter is true. The fact that PDMPs have a clear impact on 
the relationship between payments and prescribing rates demonstrates the 
persuasive (as opposed to educational) function of payments from opioid 
manufacturers. While we cannot definitively say that this persuasive role is a 
function of an incentive structure (with providers targeted to encourage more 
prescriptions) or a reward structure (with high-prescribing providers receiving 
payments as rewards), our results indicate the existence of persuasive payments 
generally.  
Though our analysis primarily relied on PDMPs as a mechanism by which 
to differentiate between persuasive and educational payments, the results of that 
analysis elucidate an important, if unintended, effect of PDMPs. The next 
Subpart explores that effect.  
B. THE UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING 
PROGRAMS 
In general, the results of this empirical analysis demonstrate that PDMP 
laws mitigate the association between pharmaceutical payments and opioid 
prescription rates. States that adopted PMDP laws over time have a weaker 
association between pharmaceutical payments and opioid prescription rates. 
This effect persists even after controlling for the emergence of a pain relief 
alternative, cannabis. While this pattern of results is consistent with 
pharmaceutical payments serving a persuasive function, it has important 
implications in and of itself. Chief among these implications is the potential of 
PDMPs to attenuate the relationships between prescribers and manufacturers.  
In general, PDMPs may reduce the effect of pharmaceutical payments on 
opioid rates via at least three different mechanisms. First, as PDMP laws were 
established in order to provide healthcare providers with information on what 
prescriptions their patients were receiving, it is possible that these programs 
corrected providers’ beliefs about their patients’ other prescriptions. Our results 
provide support for this mechanism of effect, as we see a consistently stronger 
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impact of PDMPs on providers receiving higher levels of payments. This 
suggests that PDMPs may correct misconceptions among these providers that 
opioids are under-prescribed—misconceptions that pharmaceutical companies 
have been accused of perpetuating.  
Second, though states did not establish PDMPs to expose providers to 
greater liability, it is possible that prescribers perceive a greater risk of liability 
or disciplinary action for over-prescription if a PDMP is in place. In response, 
physicians receiving payments from pharmaceutical companies may reduce the 
number of prescriptions they make in order to avoid scrutiny. This would be an 
unintended “accountability” effect of PDMPs.  
Third, as noted above, other researchers have found that companies reduce 
payments to prescribers following the adoption of a PDMP.176 Given this 
finding, our results may stem in part from a general reduction in pharmaceutical 
payments after the adoption of a PDMP. Because we group payments into tiers 
by state and year, we do not measure the effect of nominal payments over time; 
instead, we compare physicians to their in-state peers in a given year. 
Accordingly, if the pharmaceutical company generally spends less in the year 
following a PDMP enactment, a physician may receive significantly lower 
payments in the year following a PDMP enactment but remain in the same tier 
in both years. Insofar as prescription rates are sensitive to the level of payments, 
a fascinating corollary presents itself. If pharmaceutical companies reduce 
payments to physicians after the implementation of a PDMP law, this suggests 
that they believe that their payments incentivize physicians to prescribe opioids 
and that PDMP laws might chill this effect. Proving this corollary is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but these potential explanations confirm the practical 
importance of these results. 
In general, while we cannot isolate the exact mechanism by which PDMPs 
attenuate the relationship between payments and prescription rates, we can 
confidently say that PDMPs have this effect overall. Thus, our results suggest 
that PDMPs have the (likely unintended) effect of reducing the effectiveness of 
pharmaceutical payments in terms of the ability of these payments to encourage 
more opioid prescriptions. While this potentially unintended effect may appear 
rather mundane at first, it has profound implications. At their most basic level, 
persuasive payments from pharmaceutical companies create important conflicts 
of interest. Physicians may be induced to prescribe more opioids when these 
additional prescriptions are not in patients’ bests interests. Addressing this type 
of conflict of interest has proven exceedingly difficult in the past. Indeed, a 
recent study investigated the role of these conflicts in depth.177 Disclosure of the 
 
 176. Nguyen et al., supra note 128, at 23–37.  
 177. Susannah L. Rose, Sunita Sah, Raed Dweik, Cory Schmidt, MaryBeth Mercer, Ariane Mitchum, 
Michael Kattan, Matthew Karafa & Christopher Robertson, Patient Responses to Physician Disclosures of 
Industry Conflicts of Interest: A Randomized Field Experiment, ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
(forthcoming 2021). 
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underlying conflict is the most recommended method for addressing issues 
surrounding conflicts of interest. However, a randomized field experiment had 
little impact on patients’ trust of their providers.178 Thus, to the extent 
policymakers wish to address conflicts of interest, using PDMPs to reduce the 
payments that create these conflicts in the first place may be an attractive 
strategy.  
Returning to the central focus of this Article, PDMPs may also be a viable 
option to undercut the relationships that may support the behavior alleged by 
plaintiffs in the ongoing opioid litigation. By undermining these relationships—
even though the relationships we examine are perfectly legal—PDMPs may 
undercut the ability of manufacturers to engage in the conduct alleged by 
plaintiffs. Furthermore, decreasing the prominence and effectiveness of false 
and misleading advertising by weakening the relationships that facilitate it can 
only aid patients. Similarly, undermining the ability of manufacturers to target 
high-prescribing (or potentially high-prescribing) providers can also help 
patients avoid becoming addicted to opioids in the first instance. Importantly, 
these potential benefits of PDMPs exist in addition to the already well-
documented benefits these programs have in terms of reducing opioid 
prescriptions generally.179  
CONCLUSION 
Representing the greatest threat to public health of this generation, the 
opioid crisis has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans.180 
Unlike past public health crises, like the HIV epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s, 
the opioid epidemic arose within the healthcare system itself. While this 
highlights clear problems within that system, it also means that victims of the 
current crisis have access to legal redress—something victims of natural 
epidemics have never had. Thousands of lawsuits seeking this redress have been 
filed against opioid manufacturers. These claims rely on many different theories 
of liability, but two important allegations are common to many of these suits: 
(1) opioid manufacturers produced false and misleading advertising, and (2) 
manufacturers not only failed to monitor the supply of opioids but targeted 
certain high-prescribing providers.  
These common allegations—along with many others—depend critically on 
the relationships that exist between manufacturers and the healthcare providers 
that prescribe their products. Despite the importance of these relationships, 
however, little empirical evidence on the nature and strength of these 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. See supra notes 122–127 and accompanying text.  
 180. The Drug Overdose Epidemic: Behind the Numbers, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/index.html#:~:text=Overdoses%20involving%20opioids%20killed%2
0nearly,those%20deaths%20involved%20prescription%20opioids.&text=Learn%20more%20about%20the%2
0Data,epidemic%20in%20the%20United%20States (last visited Feb. 25, 2021).  
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relationships exists. This Article fills that gap by providing novel and robust 
evidence on the association between payments made by pharmaceutical 
companies and the opioid prescription rates of individual healthcare providers 
who receive those payments. The results of the analysis reported here 
demonstrate a positive relationship between payments and prescribing rates, 
with providers receiving more money from pharmaceutical companies 
prescribing more opioids.  
While the association between payments and prescribing rates may be the 
result of different activities undertaken by pharmaceutical companies—some 
more legitimate than others—our analysis demonstrates that these payments 
primarily serve to incentivize or reward more opioid prescriptions. Our analysis 
is limited to legal payments and cannot establish any liability on the part of 
manufacturers. However, it can, and does, clearly establish the existence of 
troubling relationships—relationships that persist deep into the opioid crisis. 
Indeed, the relationships evinced by the data are exactly the type that could 
facilitate the behavior alleged by plaintiffs in the current opioid litigation. As 
plaintiffs continue to fight for compensation, this continued contamination may 
prove a useful foundation on which to build their claims. The persistence of these 
results through the tail of the opioid crisis cautions against a conclusion that 
contamination of medical judgment is entirely behind us. Interventions that 
weaken the impact of this relationship—like state PDMP laws—may be the best 
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